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My thesis consists of three chapters on banking, financial markets, financial frictions and
their implications on firm innovation and growth.
Chapter 1:
Much of the research has focused on how financial constraints affect a firm’s R&D
expenditure, but little has been focused on the type of innovation. Using matched firm-
patent panel data of U.S. public firms from 1997 to 2016, Chapter 1 shows that financially
constrained firms switch toward internal (improve existing products) from external (de-
velop new product lines) innovation. For an average firm, a one standard deviation
decrease in cash-flow ratio leads to a 10-p.p. decrease in the percentage of external in-
novation. Also, the sensitivity of external innovation to cash flows is higher during the
2007-2009 financial crisis and for firms in sectors dependent on external financing. The
empirical findings are robust to various panel regression specifications. Since external
and internal innovations generate different quality improvement and growth potential,
the interaction between financial constraints and the type of innovation provides a new
mechanism by which finance affects firm and economic growth.
Chapter 2:
The firm size-growth relation plays a central role in many economic growth studies.
Empirical literature shows that this relation depends on financial market conditions:
sometimes small firms grow faster, but growth rates become independent of firm size
ii
when frictions are high (Gibrat’s law). In contrast to most growth models that assume
a fixed size-growth relation, my framework allows it to vary with financial frictions.
In the model, firms of different sizes grow by internal (improve existing products) and
external (develop new products) R&D, but R&D expenditure is restricted by profits (or
cash flows). This setup allows for rich interactions between size-growth relation and
compositional change of R&D types in evaluating how financial frictions affect aggregate
growth. The model is consistent with the fact that financially constrained firms switch
to internal R&D and reduce R&D expenditure. The equilibrium is solved with neural
networks. The estimated model suggests a significant drop in growth and welfare after
the Great Recession. The importance of size-dependent policies that subsidize small firm
R&D more than large firms is also quantified.
Chapter 3 (with TengTeng Xu and Udaibir S. Das):
We analyze how bank profitability impacts financial stability from both theoretical
and empirical perspectives. We first develop a theoretical model of the relationship
between bank profitability and financial stability by exploring the role of non-interest
income and retail-oriented business models. We then conduct panel regression analysis
to examine how the level and source of bank profitability affect risks for 431 publicly
traded banks (U.S., advanced Europe, and GSIBs) from 2004 to 2017. Results reveal
that profitability is negatively associated with both a bank’s contribution to systemic
risks and its idiosyncratic risks, and an over-reliance on non-interest income, wholesale
funding and leverage is associated with higher risks. Low competition is associated with
low idiosyncratic risks but high contribution to systemic risk. The paper’s findings suggest
that policy makers should strive to better understand the source of bank profitability,
especially where there is an over-reliance on market-based non-interest income, leverage,
and wholesale funding.
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CHAPTER 1
Financial Constraints and External versus Internal
Innovation
1.1 Introduction
The recovery from banking or other financial crises tends to be slow, usually accompanied
by sluggish productivity growth. The lack of growth has reignited researchers’ interest
in how financial frictions affect firm innovation and growth. Much of the research has
focused on the effect on firms’ overall innovation efforts (e.g., total R&D expenditure),
but less has examined whether firms will choose different types of innovation depending
on the tightness of financial constraints. In this chapter, I will investigate the empirical
relationship between financial constraints and type of innovation.
Different types of innovations generate heterogeneous quality improvements and growth
potentials. Dependent on the mixtures of innovation projects, the economy can progress
at various growth rates and feature distinct firm dynamics. If financial market conditions
indeed influence firms’ innovation decisions — external versus internal, radical versus
incremental, then how financial constraints affect the type of innovation can shed new
light on the implications of finance on firm and economic growth.
I follow [AK15] and categorize innovation into two types: external and internal inno-
vation. A firm invests in the former to improve its existing products, and the latter to
acquire new product lines. Innovation outcomes are measured by the patents in the data.
The percentage of internal innovation is defined as the share of internal patents, which
are those where 50% or more 1 of the given citations are to the prior inventions of the
filing firm (i.e., self-citation). External patents are those with less than 50% self-citations.
1I allow for other thresholds different from 50% in the robustness check.
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The dataset is constructed by matching firm and patent data from Compustat and
PatentsViews. The sample consists of U.S. public firms from 1997 to 2016 (the decades
before and after 2007). To measure a firm’s tightness of financial constraints, I use a scaled
cash-flow ratio, calculated as the product between cash flow to total asset ratio and the
sector’s median external financial dependence ratio (defined per [RZ98], it measures how
much external financing is needed per dollar of capital expenditure). The first component
measures the availability of internal finance, while the second component scales it by the
likely scarcity, which reflects the importance of internal finance, as firms in sectors more
dependent on external finance display higher sensitivity to internal funding availability.
I perform a correlated random effect IV Tobit panel regression to study the relation-
ship between financial constraints and share of internal innovation. The results show that
a one standard deviation decrease in cash flow ratio is associated with about a 10% in-
crease in internal patent share, or about the median share. I also use the Great Recession
as a natural experiment, and find that the sensitivity doubles in 2007–2009. The find-
ings are robust to different variable definitions, identification methods, and econometric
models.
In addition to documenting changes in the type of innovations, I find a decrease in
overall innovation efforts during the Great Recession, measured by R&D expenditures,
especially for small firms, which are more susceptible to financial constraints. The finding
shows that small firms’ (employment less than 100) real R&D expenditures drop by more
than 20% in the Great Recession, three times more than those of large firms. This
supports the argument that small firms were harder hit by the crisis2.
My work is related to the empirical literature on the relation between R&D and
financial markets3. [De 16] studies the effect of the Great Recession on R&D for U.S. firms
and [Pei16] provides international evidence. Many papers also use natural experiments
to analyze the effect of credit constraints on R&D: [CCW17] for the initiation of CDS
trading; [NN14] concerning the Great Depression; [COS13, CMT15, ASZ13] for banking
deregulation; and [Man18] with court rulings.
2Also see [Kab19] for evidence in the U.S., and [Sch17, Gar16] for Spain.
3See [HL10] and [KN15] for a survey.
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1.2 Data
I employ the Compustat (firm data) and PatentsView (patents) dataset. The raw data
spans Jan 1st, 1976 to May 16th, 2018. Firm and patent data are matched according to
firm names. There are 85% exact matches and 15% fuzzy matches4.
Following the selection method in [AK15], the main sample I use contains for-profit
non-financial, non-farm, public U.S. firms that are continuously innovating. A firm is
considered “continuously innovative” if it has conducted R&D or filed at least one patent
in both of the two 5-year windows, i.e., 1997-2006 and 2007-2016, when it was operational.
For patents, I consider only utility patents granted to U.S. corporations. In total, there
are 31,895 firm-year observations, 3,187 firms and 569,304 utility patents in the 1997-2016
sample. Detailed data development process is included in Appendix 4.1
To get a sense of the sampled firms, consider a snapshot in 20155. 57% of firms have
more than 500 employees (53% in 1997) and 48% more than 1,000 (45% in 1997). In
total, their R&D spending totaled $287 billion, accounting for 81% of total U.S. business
R&D in 2015. Their total sales is $5,033 billion, or 56% of all U.S. for-profit, non-farm
companies with more than five employees in 20156. Other summary statistics are in
Appendix 4.2.
1.3 R&D Expenditure Growth Rate During the Great Reces-
sion
The empirical literature has argued that firms reduce the amount of R&D expenditure
when financial constraints tighten. For example, [AAB12] documented the pro-cyclical
R&D pattern for French firms with financial constraints. Since the link between financial
constraints and R&D amount has been studied extensively in the literature, I will provide
4PatentsView is a public data source, which uses data derived from the US Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) bulk data files. See www.patentsview.org. Due to typos or different abbreviation
standards, firm names, even after standaraization, do not always match perfectly from different data
sources. For fuzzy matching, I use the package FuzzyWuzzy in Python.
52015 is the year of the most recent Business R&D and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) available as of
the writing of this paper. See www.nsf.gov/statistics/srvyindustry
6The corresponding Compustat entry was REVT.
3
Figure 1.1: Real R&D Exp. Growth Rate by Firm Size
only some aggregate evidence in this section.
Figure 1.1 plots the change in the level of R&D for firms of different sizes (similar
to [Bar07]). Real R&D expenditure growth rates drop more for smaller firms7. During
the trough (2008-2009) of the crisis, for instance, large firms’ R&D decreases by 7%, yet
small firms slashes their R&D expenditure by more than 20%. Also visible from Figure
1.1 is that small firms’ R&D spending is more volatile in general, suggesting that their
capacity to smooth out their R&D is more limited.
1.4 Internal/External R&D and Financial Frictions
This section explores the relation between financial frictions and the type of R&D—
internal vs. external innovation. I will first present aggregate-level evidence and then
firm-level panel regressions.
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Figure 1.2: Internal Innovation by Firm Size
1.4.1 Aggregate Evidence
I proxy internal R&D by internal patent share, which is defined based on patent citation
patterns. More specificially, I first calculate the share of citations a patent made to its
assignee’s prior patents, termed self-citation8, among its total backward citations. If a
patent’s self-citation share exceeds a certain threshold, it is counted as an internal patent.
Internal patent share is the ratio of internal patents to total patents applied in a given
year9. I use four thresholds to define internal patents: 30%, 50%, 30% (fuzzy) and 50%
(fuzzy). All four assign a unit weight to a patent (i.e., count as one internal patent) when
its self-citation share, x, passes the threshold, A = 30% or 50%, whereas the latter two
fuzzy measures also assign fractional weight, x/A , when x < A10.
Figure 1.2 plots the time series of internal patents by small and large firms, showing
7I categorize small and large firms according to the quartiles of firm employment. The quartile cut-offs
are set based on the 2003 sample employment distribution: 108 and 2,800 employees respectively. Year
2003 is chosen arbitrarily and will not alter the results.
8For example, when a patent in iPhone X cites another Apple patent, this citation is called self-
citation.
9For the aggregate measure plotted in Figure 1.2, I sum over all internal patents for small (large)
firms by year, then divide by all filed patents of small (large) firms to arrive at the ratio. Alternatively,
I can first calculate the internal patent share for each firm-year observation, and then take the average
across firms in a given year. However, this measure of sample mean is biased, because not every firm
filed patents every year [AK15].
10For instance, using a 50% fuzzy threshold, a patent with a 10% self-citation ratio is counted as 0.2
internal patents, but with a 50% threshold it is counted as 0 internal patent.
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that small firms drastically increase their share of internal R&D after 2007. The left
panel plots the internal patent share using a fuzzy 30% threshold. Before 2007, small
firms’ internal patent shares fluctuate around 15% and large around 30%, suggesting that
small firms focus more on external innovation (consistent with [AK15]). After 2007, small
firms’ internal share doubles to 30% (or more), yet, by contrast, that of the large firms
remains stable. This distinct response to financial crisis, a period with difficult credit
conditions, will be closely reflected in the model, where small firms are more vulnerable
to financial market imperfections.
The right panel serves as a robustness check. The conclusion from the left panel holds
under various internal patent definitions. To make different time series comparable, I
normalized large firms’ internal patent shares to one. They all point out that small firms
switch toward internal innovation during the Great Recession.
1.4.2 Firm-Level Evidence
To further analyze the effect of financial constraints on R&D type, I employ firm-level
panel regression analysis. In particular, I estimate the following equation:
Internal Patent Shareit = α0 + α1EFDs × Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1
+ α2EFDs × Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1 × Crisist
+ γ′Firm and Sector Controlsi,t−1 + ui + vt + it.
(1.1)
Internal Patent Shareit is a proxy for the internal innovation share. See section 1.4.1
for detailed definitions.
Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1 denotes the lagged cash flow to total asset ratio11.
Identification
The identification strategy relies on variation along two dimensions: (1) firms in
sectors that are dependent on external finance vs. firms in other sectors; and (2) financial
crisis (i.e., the Great Recession) vs. other time periods.
11Following [Bar07], I define cash flow = Income Before Extraordinary Items (Compustat item IB) +
Depreciation and Amortization (Compustat item DP). I use cash flow to asset rather than to physical
capital because R&D is considered intangible capital investment. Nonetheless, I included cash flow to
net property, plant and equipment (PP&E) in the robustness check.
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Across Firm Variation
To capture the sector-wise variation in combination with firm-level heterogeneity, I
construct the interacted variable
EFDs × Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1.
This variable measures the financial constraint faced by firm i, scaled by a sector-
specific factor. On the one hand, cash flow ratio reflects the cash available to be deployed.
One the other, EFDs measures the importance of such cash for a typical firm in its sector.
This is because EFDs—sector (2-digit SIC code) external financial dependence ratio—is
calculated as the sector median of (capital expenditure - operational cash flow)/capital
expenditure using 1986-1992 Compustat data12, so it is the external funding required as
a fraction of capital expenditure. If we observe α1 < 0, it implies that as lower cash flow
tightens constraints, firms perform more internal R&D.
The use of EFDs comes with three advantages. First, estimated over a long period
to smooth out cyclical fluctuation, EFDs captures the financing needs of an industry,
determined by structural characteristics. Second, based on data prior to the sample
period, it is free from concurrent compounding factors. Third, because EFDs is an
industry-level statistics, it is unaffected by individual firms13.
I employ four methods to address the endogeneity concern from Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1.
First, it is lagged by one period, which precludes the simultaneous feedback from firm
innovation choice to financing constraints. Second, I include year and firm fixed effect
ui and vt to account for any time- or firm-invariant unobservables (e.g., the availability
of new ideas in a given year and a firm’s innate tendency toward internal innovation).
Third, multiple firm and sector controls are included for time and firm variant covariates.
Last, cash flow terms are instrumented with the appropriated lagged cash flow ratios (lag
three and further) to control for any remaining endogenous factors14.
12External financial dependence follows [RZ98]. [AAB12] also show that innovative firms dependent
on external financing are sensitive to credit conditions.
13See also in [LV13]
14Also note any omitted variables that are persistent (high autocorrelation) are controlled by firm fixed
effect ui. Transitory ones (low autocorrelation) are accounted by the lagged instruments and additional
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Firm controls are Tobin’s Q, firm sale growth rate and log-transformed variables,
including total assets, capital expenditure, net PP&E, cash and short-term investment,
short-term and long-term debt, net sales and the total number of patents owned by a
firm (a.k.a. patent stock). Firm controls are lagged by one year to address endogeneity.
Additionally, I add 2-digit SIC real value-added growth rates to reflect the industry wide
demand factors.
Across Time Variation
The interaction of EFDs×Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1×Crisist captures the potential change
in the impact of financing constraints during the Great Recession, essentially treating the
crisis as a natural experiment. Crisist is a binary variable, equaling 1 if t = 2007, 2008 or
2009. If the crisis exacerbated the financing constraints even if cash flow and external
financial dependence stayed the same, we would expect α2 < 0. A significant and negative
α2 thus signals deteriorated financial conditions that are not explained by a firm’s own
characteristics.
Econometric Assumptions
However, there are some complications arising from the “small N large T ” panel data
structure and the fact that the dependent variable is left and right censored. Next, I
explain my econometric assumptions to cope with these difficulties.
In the preferred specification, I use a correlated random effect Tobit model with
instrument variables.
The internal patent share is left-censored at 0 (1/3 to 1/2 of the observations) and
right-censored at 100% (1% of the observations), because firms with 0 or 100% internal
patent share can still have different degrees of “internalness” as I do not control for the
actual contents of patents: some may conduct more exploratative R&D than others.
Thus, it is more appropriate to use a Tobit regression.
A concern for a nonlinear regression like Tobit is that one cannot estimate ui using
fixed-effect models, due to the “incidental parameter bias.” I follow the Chamberlain-
Mundlak approach of correlated random effect by assuming
ui = a0 + a
′
1x¯i + a
′
2z¯i + ei
control variables.
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where x¯i =
∑
xit/T , z¯i =
∑
zit/T , xi is the independent variable(s), zi other controls,
and T the number of years when a firm is operational.
To further overcome potential endogenity issues, I used the 3rd to 8th lags of inde-
pendent variables as instruments15.
Regression Results
The results are shown in Table 1.1. Following [AK15], I use 50% as the threshold of
internal patent definition. The preferred specification, IV Tobit with correlated random
effects, is presented in Column (5). For a robustness check, I also adopted a fixed effect
static panel regression (Model 1), dynamic panel system-GMM estimator developed by
[AB95] and [BB98] (Model 2), random effect Tobit regression (Model 3) and correlated
random effect Tobit without instrument variables (Model 4).
The first coefficient, or α1 in (1.1), is negative and statistically significant, which im-
plies that when financial constraints loosen due to the increased internal funding (i.e.,
cash flow ratio increases), firms lean toward more external (exploratory) innovation (and
thus internal patent ratio decreases), especially firms in sectors more dependent on ex-
ternal financing (higher EFDs). The coefficients are also economically significant. A one
standard deviation decrease in the independent variable (0.85) is associated with a 9.3
percentage point increase in internal patent share, more than the median share of 5%.
The estimates of α2 in (1.1) are presented next. They are mostly negative and signif-
icant as well, except for the regression using a 50% fuzzy threshold where the estimates
are insignificant at a 10% confidence level. In terms of magnitude, they are close to that
of α1, meaning that the relation between cash flow and R&D becomes much more signifi-
cant during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Everything else equal, firms are more sensitive
to internal funding and more susceptible to credit market conditions. One interpretation
is that firms become much more risk averse and thus avert external innovation. Alterna-
tively, firms find it harder to secure outside funding from banks or financial markets and
thus are more cautious in their R&D projects. Either interpretation suggests an adverse
shock to firm R&D decisions.
15The construction of instrument variables resembles Arellano-Bond. See [Roo09]
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Table 1.1: Regression of Internal Patent Share and Financial Constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Models Fixed Effect System GMM RE Tobit CRE Tobit IV Tobit
Dependent Variable:
Internal patent share, defined as patents with a self-citation share larger than or equal to 50%
Independent Variable:
(Lag) Cash Flow/Asset × (1986-1992) Sector External Financial Dependence
α1 . . . -0.00220 -0.0191** -0.0358** -0.0181* -0.109***
(0.0100) (0.00847) (0.0181) (0.0109) (0.0421)
α2 ×Crisis -0.0562** -0.0728*** -0.118*** -0.105*** -0.0886*
(0.0261) (0.0166) (0.0349) (0.0351) (0.0519)
Observations 6,239 5,300 6,239 6,217 6,217
Number of firms 1,365 1,084 1,365 1,365 1,343
Controls and Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Random Correlated Correlated
Instrument variables Y Y
a. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Sample: 2002-2016. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. Model
(1) uses a within estimator with std. err. clustered by firm. Model (2) employs the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-
Bond two-step estimator with the 3rd till 8th lags of indep. variables as instruments. Model (3) is a random
effect Tobit model. Model (4) applies a correlated random effect Tobit model, a.k.a. Chamberlain-Mundlak
approach, where unobserved time-invariant effect is estimated as a function of sample-period averages of
controls and independent variables (std. err. clustered by firm). Model (5) uses lagged indep. variables (3rd
and deeper) as instruments on top of Model (4), and adopts Newey’s (1987) two-step estimator. Self-citation:
when a patent cites its assignee’s prior patents. Self-citation share for a patent = self-citations/total citations
made. External financial dependence follows [RZ98] using 1986-1992 Compustat data, defined as the sector
(2-digit SIC) median of (capital expenditure - operational cash flow) / capital expenditure. Firm controls
are lagged by one year, including Tobin’s Q and log-transformed total assets, capital expenditure, net PP&E,
cash and short-term investment, short-term and long-term debt, net sales, sale growth rate and patent stock.
Sector controls are real value-added growth rates. For (2), the p-value of Hansen and autocorrelation test is
0.163 and 0.382 (valid IVs). For (5), the Wald exogeneity test p-value is 0.0457 (justify using IVs).
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1.5 Robustness Check
I performed various robustness checks with different samples, variable definitions and
identification methods. All robustness check regressions are based on an IV correlated
random effect Tobit (Model 5 in Table 1.1).
The first set of regressions adopt different definitions of internal patents, shown in
Table 1.2. As evident in the table, both estimates of α1 and α2 remain negative and
significant.
The second set of results employ the 50% threshold and econometric assumptions set
forth in Model (5) in Table 1.1. The results are listed in Table 1.3. In Column (1), I
include the full set of interaction terms16 among EFDs, Crisist and Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1.
The regression equation is now
Internal Patent Shareit =α0 + α1EFDs × Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1
+ α2EFDs × Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1 × Crisist
+ α3Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1 × Crisist + α4Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1
+ γ′Firm and Sector Controlsi,t−1 + ui + vt + it.
Both α1 and α2 show conclusions similar to those in Table 1.1.
I expand the sample by another ten years (prior to 2002) to be 1992-2016, shown in
Column (2).
For Column (3), I replace the continuous variable EFDs by a binary variable IEFDs.
IEFDs = 1 if EFDs > median EFDs across all industries. Firms with IEFDs = 1
are considered the treatment group, and Crisist is a natural experiment. I then adopt
regression discontinuity by estimating
Internal Patent Shareit =α0 + α1IEFDs × Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1
+ α2IEFDs × Crisist × Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1
+ α3Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1 × Crisist + α4Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1
+ γ′Firm and Sector Controlsi,t−1 + ui + vt + it.
16Common in the literature using external financial dependence, the full interaction set is not necessary.
See [RZ98, LV13]. Note that here it is not necessary to include the term EFDs separately, as the sector
time-invariant effect is already captured by the firm fixed effect.
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Table 1.2: Regression with Different Internal Patent Definition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable:
Internal patent share, defined with a self-citation share larger than or equal to the following values
Threshold of internal patent 30% Fuzzy 30% 50% Fuzzy 50%
Independent Variable:
(Lag) Cash Flow/Asset × (1986-1992) Sector External Financial Dependence
... -0.0720*** -0.131*** -0.101*** -0.109***
(0.0229) (0.0464) (0.0322) (0.0421)
×Crisis -0.0407** -0.0574** -0.0209 -0.0886*
(0.0206) (0.0289) (0.0388) (0.0519)
Firm and Sector Controls Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Correlated Correlated Correlated Correlated
Instrument Variables Y Y Y Y
Observations 6,217 6,217 6,217 6,217
a. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Sample period: 2002-2016. All variables (including controls) are winsorized at
1% and 99%. All regressions adopt the specification as Model (5) in Table 1.1. For details of controls and variable
definitions, see the footnotes to Table 1.1.
b. Self-citation: when a patent cites its assignee’s prior patents. Self-citation share for a patent = self-citations/total
citations made (a.k.a. backward citations). I define internal patent using four thresholds: 30%, 50%, 30% (fuzzy)
and 50% (fuzzy): all four assign a unit weight to a patent (i.e., count as one internal patent) when its self-citation
share, x, passes the threshold, A, whereas the latter two also assign fractional weight, x/A , when x < A.
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Table 1.3: Robustness Check of Internal Innovation and Financial Constraints Regression (1/2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable:
Internal patent share, defined as patents with a self-citation share larger than or equal to 50%
Independent Variable:
(Lag) Cash Flow/Asset × . . .
. . . (86-92) Sector External Financial Dependence -0.103* -0.117***
(0.0562) (0.0451)
. . . Crisis × (86-92) Sector External Financial Dependence -0.412** -0.0849**
(0.171) (0.0424)
. . . (86-92) EFD Dummy -0.266***
(0.0833)
. . . Crisis × (86-92) EFD Dummy -1.140**
(0.502)
. . . (86-01) Sector External Financial Dependence -0.0559**
(0.0234)
. . . Crisis × (86-01) Sector External Financial Dependence -0.0294
(0.0222)
Wald Test of Exogeneity (p-value) 0.0655 0.1014 0.163 0.0711
Observations 6,217 9,366 6,217 6,217
Number of Firms 1,365 1,708 1,365 1,365
Sample Period 2002-2016 1992-2016 2002-2016 2002-2016
a. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All variables (including controls) are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All regressions apply
correlated random effect IV Tobit model as Model (5) in Table 1.1. Model (1) includes the full interaction; (2) expands the
sample to 1992-2016; (3) uses external financial dependence (EFD) dummy and DID; (4) uses 1986-2001 EFD.
b. For details of controls and variable definitions, see the footnotes to Table 1.1.
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Table 1.4: Robustness Check of Internal Innovation and Financial Constraints Regression (2/2)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable:
Internal patent share, defined as patents with a self-citation share larger than or equal to 50%
Independent Variable:
(Lag) Cash Flow/Asset × . . .
. . . (86-92) Sector External Financial Dependence -0.148***
(0.0409)
. . . 0.0807
(0.0611)
. . . Crisis -0.132***
(0.0477)
. . . Dividend Dummy -0.0939
(0.149)
. . . Crisis × Dividend Dummy -0.497*
(0.278)
(Lag) Cash Flow/Net PP&E × . . .
... (86-92) Sector External Financial Dependence -0.000445*
(0.000226)
... Crisis × (86-92) Sector External Financial Dependence -0.0129***
(0.00328)
0.0251 0.1122 0.023 0.135
Wald Test of Exogeneity (p-value) 6,217 6,217 6,217 6217
Observations 1,365 1,365 1,365 1,365
Number of Firms 2002-2016 2002-2016 2002-2016 2002-2016
Sample Period
a. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. All variables (including controls) are winsorized at 1% and 99%. All regressions apply
correlated random effect IV Tobit model as Model (5) in Table 1.1. Model (5) drops the interaction with crisis dummy; (6)
drops the interaction with EFD; (7) uses a dividend dummy; (8) uses cash flow to net pp&e ratio. The detailed explanation
is in the main text.
b. For details of controls and variable definitions, see the footnotes to Table 1.1.
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Similarly, α1 and α2 are reported.
I then change the calculation of EFDs using 1986 to 2001 data instead of 1986 to 1992
as the main specification. α1 is still significant at a 5% level.
In Column (5), I drop the Crisist from the interaction term in regression equation
(1.1), essentially forcing the coefficient of EFDs × Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1, i.e., α1 to be
time-invariant. As expected, the estimate is negative and statistically significant.
For (6), I drop the EFDs in the interaction and only interact Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1
with Crisist. In this way, I do not differentiate firms according to their external finan-
cial dependence. Instead, I analyze how the Great Recession, as a natural experiment,
altered the relation between financing constraints and R&D for a given firm. The coef-
ficient of Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1 is insignificant, suggesting that on average, there is not
strong evidence of financial friction’s effect on R&D trajectory. This justifies control-
ling for external financing dependence in the main specification to identify their link (as
mentioned in [AAB12]). The coefficient of Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1 ×Crisist is still negative
and significant at a 1% level, indicating that the financial condition worsened during the
crisis.
For (7), I use the dividend payout pattern of a firm to determine when a firm is
financially constrained. Following [BM06], I construct a dummy variable, Divi,t, that
equals zero when dividends are positive in both adjacent periods, and one otherwise.
Divi,t = 1 therefore signals an abrupt cessation in dividend payout, suggesting financial
hardship. The regression equation is
Internal Patent Shareit =α0 + α1Divi,t × Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1
+ α2Divi,t × Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1 × Crisist
+ α3Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1 × Crisist + α4Cash Flow Ratioi,t−1
+ γ′Firm and Sector Controlsi,t−1 + ui + vt + it.
As shown in Table 1.3, α2 is negative and significant. Financially stressed firms during
the crisis indeed changed their R&D to be more internally oriented.
One advantage of (7) is that Divi,t is now firm and time specific, allowing firms within
the same sector to be categorized differently in terms of financial constraint, and enabling
firms to switch in and out of constraints. Yet a major drawback is that most innovative
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small firms do not pay dividends at all in the whole sampling period (so Divi,t = 0 for
all t), and many firms that stopped dividend payout (so Divi,t = 1 for all t) are mature
and less innovative. In addition, firms may reduce dividend payout rather than stop it
completely. Due to these drawbacks, the main specification applies external financial
dependence.
Lastly in (8), I change the definition of cash flow ratio. It is now calculated cash flow
to net PP&E ratio. The conclusion stays unchanged.
1.6 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the empirical relationship between financial constraints and the
type of firm innovations: internal (improve existing products) versus external (develop
new product lines) innovation. The analysis, using matched firm-patent panel data of
U.S. public firms from 1997 to 2016, reveals that firms become more inclined towards
internal innovation when financially constrained, especially during the Great Recession.
As external innovation has contributed more than internal innovation to U.S. economic
growth, at least during the 1982-1997 period estimated by [AK15], and is an essential
channel through which small firms grow, the alteration in innovation type can have pro-
found implications on economic growth and firm dynamics. Hence, the findings imply
that studies of the effects of financial frictions on firm innovation and growth should
consider this new dimension in which innovation responds to financial constraints.
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CHAPTER 2
The Impact of Financial Frictions on Innovation and
the Size-Growth Relationship among Heterogeneous
Firms
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between firm size and firm growth plays a central role in several classes
of growth models and also in many models of firm dynamics. Most models assume a
fixed relation: Some are based on Gibrat’s law1 that a firm’s growth rate is independent
of its size, while others feature a structure in which small firms grow faster than large
firms2. Empirically, however, the firm size-growth relation is shown to be dependent
on financial market conditions: Small firms grow faster3 unless financial frictions are
high, in which case we observe Gibrat’s law45. This paper is among the first, to the
best of my knowledge, to develop a unified framework that can account for both sets of
observations, in which the relationship between firm growth and size depends critically
on financial frictions—how difficult it is for firms to obtain outside financing.
The interaction between firm size-growth relation and financial frictions affects how
firms innovate, which in turn influences economic growth. By considering both firm
1See [KK04],[LM08] and [AC15].
2See [AK15] and [AAA17]
3 See [Sut97, Cav98, LM08, AK15].
4 See [LSN10, LVS05, Cho10, FDA04, FM00, AA90]. For a literature review, see [NAA14, SKT06];
and Chapter 4 of [Coa09].
5 The literature provides empirical evidence of the effect of financial frictions/development on firm
growth, in both advanced and emerging economies. Some explicitly study Gibrat’s law, such as
[LVS05, Van05, AE06, AE10, LSN10]. Others examine the impact of finance on small firm growth
more specifically, as in [KLC16, BDL08, CP02, BT02, BD06, BDM05]. [SV07] also offer a survey on how
credit constraints limit the survival and growth rate of small firms.
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dynamics and its effect on innovation, this framework allows me to analyze the aggregate
implications of financial frictions with a much richer set of economic forces that that have
been studied only in isolation. How small and large firms react differently to frictions?
How would they adjust not only the amount but also the type of R&D they perform?
How will firm size distribution evolve?
The model is an extension of [AK15] with financial constraints. Firms grow by
performing two types of R&D: internal—improving existing products—and external—
developing new products6. Subject to financial constraints, a firm’s R&D expenditure is
restricted by its internal funding: R&D costs cannot exceed a multiple (termed “pledge-
ability”) of firm profits (so profits function as collateral).
In the model, financially constrained firms reduce their overall R&D expenditure and
increase the share of internal innovation. The latter shift in R&D trajectory stems from
the fact that external R&D is more elastic than internal R&D (due to, for instance, higher
fixed costs). As a result, external R&D decreases proportionally more than internal R&D
when constraints worsen.
The tightness of the financial constraint dictates the size-growth relation. On the one
hand, when financial frictions are low, R&D is not (too) restricted by its cost. Assuming
that a firm’s ability in external R&D does not increase proportionally (linearly) with
its number of product lines, small firms will thus be better at introducing new products
(relative to their size) and grow faster, even if all firms are equally skilled in internal
R&D7. On the other hand, R&D can be significantly constrained when financial frictions
are high. This has two consequences. First, internal R&D share increases so small firms
lose their comparative advantage; second, the overall level of R&D decreases, especially
for small firms. Since external R&D is undirected, its cost depends on the aggregate level
of productivity8, so a less productive firm with lower profit will find R&D hard to afford.
6An example of the first kind is Apple’s upgrade of iPhone each year, and of the second is Apple’s
introduction of a new electric vehicle business line (to compete with Tesla). This paper features creative
destruction. Therefore, when a firm develops a new product, it captures market share from other firms.
7 Intuitively, external R&D is not perfectly scalable because it is hard to use the knowledge/expertise
embedded in existing product lines for new product development. For instance, compared to a start-up,
Apple may be better at smartphone innovation, but no more capable at electric car engineering.
8 For example, when Apple wants to develop electric vehicles (EVs), its R&D costs depend on the
quality (and cost) of EVs in general, not iPhone’s quality or costs.
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Such firms are also likely to be smaller. With these two results combined, small firm
growth rates are disproportionally reduced.
The model is consistent with several empirical observations made after the Great Re-
cession. First, as described in Chapter 1, firms, especially small firms, reduce their R&D
expenditure and switch toward internal innovation when financial constraints tighten.
In addition, I document a drastic change in the size-growth pattern for U.S. innovative
firms after 2007. Before 2007, there is a negative and significant relation between firm
size and growth rate. However, this relation becomes insignificant after 2007. The result
persists even after accounting for survival bias (Heckman), measurement error, and firm
life cycle. This is consistent with the empirical literature that firm growth rate is affected
by financial market conditions.
Before performing quantitative counterfactual analysis, I solve the equilibrium nu-
merically and estimate model parameters by Simulated Method of Moments. The model
solution is challenging. Because external R&D is undirected, firm value functions depend
on the entire productivity distribution, which is an infinite-dimensional object charac-
terized by a system of integro-differential delayed equations influenced concurrently by
firm decisions. The solution method is inspired by reinforcement learning. In essence, I
expand the state space for the value function to include firm-specific states, endogenous
variables such as growth rate, to-be-estimated parameters, and discretized productivity
distribution density: in total, 121 dimensions. The value function is then solved as a
neural network by iteration over the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
I consider three adverse scenarios for the economy: a 5% drop in profit pledgeability9,
a 5% drop in aggregate demand (which reduces profits), and both. In the third case, the
size-growth relation and labor productivity growth rate match well with their empirical
counterparts in 2007–2016, suggesting a 22.8% drop in consumption-equivalent welfare if
such counterfactual adverse drops are permanent.
Based on the third scenario with both drops, I analyze the effects of two policies. One
is a 10% R&D subsidy to all firms, and the other is size-dependent. The second policy has
an ex ante average subsidy rate of 10%, but a higher rate for smaller firms. The uniform
9Recall that R&D costs cannot exceed a multiple of profits. I estimate that the latter was reduced
by 5% in 2007–2016 compared with 1997–2006.
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subsidy improves the welfare to 82.3% of the baseline economy and the size-dependent
subsidy to 88.5%. This suggests that offering more support to smaller firms, which are
both more productive at R&D and susceptible to financial market conditions, can be
beneficial.
2.2 Related Literature
This paper provides a unified theoretical framework in which the size-growth relation
varies with financial frictions. The Schumperterian growth literature predicts either pro-
portional growth, such as [KK04] or a faster growth rate for small firms, as in [AK15] and
[AAA17]. This paper offers a reconciliation of these two strands of models by introduc-
ing a constraint on R&D expenditures, which reacts to changes in demand or financial
market conditions10.
Related to the study on the aggregate impact of financial frictions, this paper con-
tributes by incorporating a rich set of firm heterogeneity: R&D type, firm size, and firm
productivity. Earlier papers consider a representative firm setting11. More recently, some
authors stress the important role of firm heterogeneity in amplifying the impact of shocks.
For example, [Gar16] considers how firms with different intangible capital to capital ra-
tios react to asset price shocks in an economy with collateral constraints. However, his
model does not feature endogenous growth. More closely related to my paper is [Sch17].
We both consider heterogeneous firms and imperfectly scalable R&D technology, but our
models differ in two ways. First, he studies a one-time financial shock by which firms are
cut out of financial markets and must rely on self-financing, while my definition of friction
is more general: The pledgeability of cash flow is a continuous variable. Therefore, in
addition to analyzing the aftermaths of a financial crisis, my model is useful for com-
paring countries with different financial market development. Second, I incorporate both
internal and external R&D—another important dimension of heterogeneity—because the
10Empirically, this paper also provides evidence supporting the view that the validity of Gibrat’s law
is dependent on the economic environment (see footnotes 4, 5, and 3 for a brief review).
11 [CG06] and [ACG16] study R&D in an expanding variety framework, and [Bar07] considers a
quality ladder model. Some papers study the effect of shocks and/or frictions on human/physical capital
accumulation and growth, including [AAB10] and [BKM19].
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two types of R&D make distinct contributions to aggregate growth [AK15].
This paper is part of the nascent literature on solving complex continuous time het-
erogeneous agent models using machine learning techniques. [FHN18] use supervised
learning tools to approximate the evolution of aggregate variables. [Dua18] applies rein-
forcement learning to solve value functions as neural networks. Building on [Dua18], I
extend his method by considering a model in which endogenous distribution of agent types
directly affects agents’ decisions, and incorporate such a distribution into the domain of
value function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.3 presents three empirical
findings and Section 2.4 presents the model. Several theoretical results are derived in
Section 2.5. Section 2.6 quantifies the model and examines counterfactuals and R&D
policies, and Section 2.7 concludes. Detailed proofs and the data description are included
in the Appendix.
2.3 Firm Size-Growth Relation and the Great Recession
In this section, I document the empirical observations about the firm size-growth relation
that motivate the model. The dataset is the same as in Chapter 1.
The last empirical fact pertains to the firm size-growth relation before and after the
Great Recession in the U.S.. I find a negative relation between size and growth rate for
all time periods except since 2007.
2.3.1 Baseline Regression
Following [AK15], I run the regression:
gf,t = α + ηSector×Year + β log(Employmentf,t) + f,t (2.1)
where gf,t =
Employmentt+1
Employmentt
− 1 and gf,t = −1 if firm f exits at time t+ 1.
Table 2.1 contains the regression results. Column (1) and (2) refer to the estimates
based on the 5-year or 10-year periods before 2007, while (3) and (4) on the post 2007
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Table 2.1: Size-Growth Relation Before and After 2007
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2002-2006 1997-2006 2007-2011 2007-2016
5-year 10-year 5-year 10-year
Log Employment -0.0322** -0.0336*** 0.00142 -0.00668
(0.0126) (0.00749) (0.00387) (0.00457)
Constant 0.0137* 0.0188*** -0.0253*** 0.0183***
(0.00701) (0.00650) (0.00543) (0.00588)
Observations 8,519 18,209 6,978 13,208
Sector-Year Controls Y Y Y Y
a. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 Windsorized at 1% and 99%. Standard errors
are clustered by firm.
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counterparts. The estimates of β are negative and significant12 prior to the Great Reces-
sion, indicating that small innovative firms grow faster than larger ones. However, such
negative size-growth relation became statistically insignificant after 2007. In other words,
we cannot reject Gibrat’s law (β = 0) after the Great Recession.
The regression results echo the argument that size-growth relation is dependent on
economic environment (see footnote 3), as firms found it harder to secure outside financing
and suffered from diminished profits (inside financing) during the Great Recession. Both
types of adverse development—tightened credits and dampened aggregate demand—will
be reflected in the model as possible drivers of an increase in financial frictions.
2.3.2 Robustness Check
To test the robustness of the baseline results, I will control for firm survival bias, mea-
surement errors and sample selections13.
Table 2.2 presents the results. Column (1) is the baseline regression using 2002-2011
data with minor adjustment, given by
gf,t = α + ηSector×Year + β1 log(Employmentf,t) + β2 log(Employmentf,t)× Post 2007t
+ β3Post 2007t + f,t
(2.2)
where indicator variable Post 2007t = 1 for t ≥ 2007. β1 measures the pre-2007 size-
growth relation, β1 + β2 the post-2007 relation and β2 the difference between the two.
Their estimates are the same as those in (1) and (3) in Table 2.1. β2 > 0 highlights the
diminished size-growth relation after 2007.
I correct for the survival bias using the two-step Heckman selection model. In the
baseline regression, when a firm exits the sample data, I set its employment growth
rate gf,t to −1. However, this overestimates the actual growth rate employment before
a firm exits, as −1 is the lower bound. Since small firms have higher exit rates, the
12[AK15] estimate β to be -0.0351 with standard error 0.0013 over the 1982-1997 period, which is very
close to my estimates.
13I follow a robustness check similar to that in [Akc08]
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Table 2.2: Robustness Check of Firm Size-Growth Relation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model Baseline Heckman Select IV Age
Dependent variable: Employment growth rate
Independent variables
Log employment -0.0322** -0.0394*** 0.0700*** -0.0292** -0.0283**
(0.0126) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0132) (0.0129)
Log employment × Post 2007 0.0336** 0.0384*** 0.0254* 0.0316** 0.0339**
(0.0132) (0.00770) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0132)
Log total long-term debt 0.00716**
(0.00354)
Log debt due in 1 year -0.0131***
(0.00394)
Age -0.00262***
(0.000611)
Constant -0.00388 0.0816 1.463*** -0.160* 0.0411***
(0.00465) (0.248) (0.0242) (0.0957) (0.0114)
Observations 15,497 15,296 (1,162 censored) 15,497 15,497
Sector-Year FE Y Y Y Y
Instruments Y
a. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Sample period: 2002-2011. All variables (including controls) are
winsorized at 1% and 99%. Robust std. err. are clustered by firm in the parentheses. “Post 2007” is an
indicator variable.
b. Model (1) is the baseline OLS with sector-year fixed effects. Model (2) uses the Heckman selection model,
with the selection equation in the “select” column. Model (3) is 2SLS with lagged log employment as
instruments. In Model (4), “age” is the year since a firm first appeared in Compustat (from 1970/1).
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overestimation penalizes small firm growth rates, and thus β1 is biased upward (closer
to 0). To apply the Heckman selection model, I defined selected firms as remaining
(surviving) firms. The selection equation is
0 <b0 + b1 log(Employmentf,t) + b2 log(Employmentf,t)× Post 2007t + b3Post 2007t
+ b4 log(Total Long-Term Debt)f,t + b5 log(Debt Due in 1 Year)f,t + uf,t.
(2.3)
Model (2) shows the Heckman regression results. The right sub-column presents the
selection equation. The negative coefficient of log(Debt Due in 1 Year)f,t shows that,
after controlling for the total indebtedness by log(Total Long-Term Debt)f,t, firms with
more short-term debts are associated with lower survival probability. Also, the positive
b1 estimate implies that large firms are more likely to survive.
From the left sub-column in (2), we see consistent results with the baseline regression.
It shows a more negative β1 as expected. In addition, a positive β2 estimate indicates
that small firms’ growth rates were more negatively impacted after 2007.
Column (3) accounts for possible measurement error in the proxy for firm size, i.e., firm
employment. Since employment appears both in the regressors and denominator of the
left-hand size variables, a measurement error can generate spurious negative association
between size and growth rate and thus downward bias on β2 (away from 0). I address
this concern using lagged log(Employment) as instruments and apply a two-stage least
square Model (2SLS). As expected, β1 is closer to zero than Model (1). Nonetheless, the
main conclusion remains unchanged14.
Lastly, I address the sample selection problem in Column (4). Due to data limitation
(Compustat), I include only public U.S. firms, so only 25% of the sample firms are
considered typical “small” firms (less than 100 employees). This selection problem is
solved by including age, a proxy of firm life-cycle, in the regression15. The negative
14The 2SLS model controlled for firm-clustered standard errors (SEs), which makes a standard overi-
dentification test difficult to implement. I refit the model using heteroskedasticity-robust SEs (I obtain
similar results as the cluster-robust SEs) and perform Wooldridge’s score test of overidentifying restric-
tions. The p-value for the test is 0.2588, suggesting that the instruments are valid.
15Age is calculated as the number of years since a firm first appeared in the Compustat database.
25
Figure 2.1: Overview of the Model
coefficient of age indicates that firm growth rate decreases with age. The estimates of β1
and β2 remain relatively unchanged
16.
2.4 Model
In this section, I will build a model that can generate a different size-growth pattern
depending on the tightness of financial frictions. The overview of the model is summarized
in Figure 2.1.
16In addition, I run the regression with firm fixed effects to control for unobserved firm characteristics.
The conclusions from the baseline model still hold.
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2.4.1 Environment and Preferences
I consider a closed economy in a continuous time setting, admitting a representative
household with CRRA utility function
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
c(t)1−θ − 1
1− θ dt (2.4)
where ρ > 0 is the discount factor, θ is the constant relative risk aversion parameter and
c(t) is consumption at time t. The household is populated by a continuum of individuals
with measure one. Each one is endowed with one unit of labor, L = 1, that is supplied
inelastically at wage rate w(t). The household also owns all the firms in the economy,
which generates a risk-free flow rate of return r(t). Therefore, the household maximizes
(2.4) subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
c(t) + a˙(t) ≤ r(t)a(t) + w(t) (2.5)
where a(t) is the asset holdings of the household.
Individuals consume a final good Y (t), which is also used for R&D (to be discussed
later). The final good market is perfectly competitive. The final good is produced using a
continuum of intermediate goods j ∈ [0, 1] according to the CES production technology:
Y (t) = A
(∫ 1
0
yj(t)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
(2.6)
where yj(t) is the quantity of intermediate goods j,  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between products, and A is the aggregate demand parameter—for reasons that will be
made clear in Section 2.4.2. The final good Y (t) is chosen as the numeraire.
2.4.2 Intermediate Goods Production and R&D
Measure M (endogenously determined) of firms produce intermediate goods. Each firm,
indexed by f ∈ M ∈ (0, 1), owns a countable set of product lines j ∈ Jf ⊂ [0, 1]. A firm
is characterized by the number of product lines nf it operates (nf is the cardinality of
the set Jf ) and its labor productivity zf . Each good j ∈ Jf is produced according to the
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linear technology
yj = zf lj. (2.7)
Compared with models such as [AK15] and [AAA17], I simplify the model by assuming
the same productivity zf for all j ∈ Jf , instead of making the productivity good-specific
(i.e., zj 6= zi for i, j ∈ Jf ). With this simplification, I do not need to keep track of
the multiset of productivity or the product portfolio of firm f . This will not affect the
Schumpeterian (creative destruction) nature of the model, which will be explained in
Section 2.4.2.2.
I define the aggregate labor productivity (or aggregate productivity for short) as
z¯ ≡
∫ M
0
∑
j∈Jf
z−1f df
 1−1 = [∫ 1
0
z−1j dj
] 1
−1
(2.8)
and the relative productivity by zˆ ≡ z/z¯.
I omit the firm index f from now on when there is no confusion.
2.4.2.1 Profit Maximization
Each intermediate good producer is a monopolist17. The inverse demand function for
each good j is
pj = (Y/yj)
1
A
−1
 = A
(
z¯
yj
)1/
. (2.9)
Therefore, I interpret A as an aggregate demand parameter.
As shown in Appendix 4.3, in equilibrium, a firm characterized by (n, z) earns profits
Π(n, z) = max
{yj},{lj}j∈J
∑
j∈J
[pjyj − wlj] = nz¯Azˆ−1/. (2.10)
17One can rationalize this assumption using a two-stage bidding game as [AK15].
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Table 2.3: Internal versus External Innovation
Internal R&D External R&D
Example iPhone X Apple Car
n changes to n n+ 1
zˆ changes to (1 + λ)zˆ n
n+1
zˆ + 1
n+1
(1 + η)z′
Success rate αIk
βI
I n
1+γαxk
βx
x
Research intensity kI kx
Elasticity βI βx > βI
Return to scale Constant Decreasing as γ < 0
R&D cost z¯nzˆ−1kI E(nz¯zˆ−1kx) = nz¯kx
a. Innovation follows a Poisson process. z′ is a random draw from
existing zˆ distribution φ(zˆ). So z′ is the original productivity of
the product line being replaced (e.g., Nokia’s productivity when
iPhone replaced it).
2.4.2.2 Innovation
As is common in Schumpeterian models, the producer of each intermediate good j will be
replaced by another firm (i.e., through creative destruction) unless it can keep innovating
and successfully maintain its monopoly. There are two ways for a firm to innovate:
internal R&D and external R&D. The former improves a firm’s productivity and the
latter expands its product lines by capturing markets from another incumbent. Table 2.3
summarizes the distinction between these two types of innovation.
Internal Innovation
Incumbents undertake internal innovation (a.k.a. R&D) to improve their labor pro-
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ductivity. Successful internal R&D arrives at the instantaneous Poisson rate
I = FI(kI) = αIk
βI
I (2.11)
where kI is the internal research intensity, 0 < βI < 1 is the internal innovation elasticity,
and αI > 0 is a scalar. Conditional on a successful internal innovation, firms’ n and z
update according to
n→ n and z → (1 + λ)z
where λ > 0 is a multiplicative factor for productivity improvement.
External Innovation
Firms can also conduct external R&D to develop products that they do not currently
produce18. External innovations are realized with the Poisson flow rate
X ≡ nxn = nFx(kx, n) = nαxkβxx nγ (2.12)
where kx can be interpreted as external research intensity, αx > 0, 0 < βI < βx < 1 and
−1 ≤ γ ≤ 0.
The condition βI < βX implies that the success rate of external R&D is more elastic
to R&D intensity (R&D inputs). One interpretation is that external R&D will succeed
only when its research intensity is higher than some thresholds19, making the innovation
outcome very sensitive around these thresholds.
Another key assumption is −1 ≤ γ ≤ 0, following [AK15]. As γ ≥ −1, the rate
of external R&D is increasing in n—the number of product lines—because firms with
more product lines are likely to have expertise in multiple fields, raising their odds of
developing new products20. In addition, γ ≤ 0 suggests that external R&D production
18In Schumpeterian models such as this one, the economy-wise variety of products is constant. Firms
compete to obtain market from other incumbents.
19This is quite reasonable considering one needs to develop products in a completely new field/market.
A firm will have to spend a certain amount in R&D, such as hiring new researchers, conducting market
surveys, and making general administrative adjustments, before it can develop a new product line.
20As suggested by [KK04], n captures the human capital embedded in product lines.
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function has a diminishing return to n (a.k.a. imperfect scalablility), because a firm’s skill
in new product development does not increase linearly with its expertise in its current
product lines 21 (see also in footnote 7.).
Conditional on a successful external innovation,
n→ n+ 1 and z → nz
n+ 1
+
z′(1 + η)
n+ 1
where z′ is the new product line’s original producer’s labor productivity (recall that a
firm has to capture market from an incumbent) and η > 0.
It should be noted that the firm’s new productivity is a weighted average between its
original z and new z′(1 + η). A firm’s total labor productivity nz always increases after
external R&D22, now becoming nz + z′(1 + η). As a result, the economy-wise aggregate
productivity z¯ is always increasing. However, the average labor productivity z for a firm
can decrease if z′  z. This allows the model to capture the dilution effect of introducing
a new product line, which is neglected by other Schumpeterian models23.
Because external R&D is undirected across of all product lines j ∈ [0, 1], a firm
has equal probability to capture the market from any other incumbents. As a result,
z′ is a random draw from the current (endogenous) distribution of labor productivity.
Furthermore, since each firm’s product portfolio is of measure zero, firms will not innovate
over their own product lines through external innovation.
2.4.2.3 R&D Cost Function
From Equation (2.10) and Section 2.4.2.2, it is clear that we can equivalently characterize
a firm by n and its relative labor productivity zˆ.
The cost of internal innovation in units of final goods is z¯nzˆ−1kI . It is proportional
to n and kI , but convex in relative productivity zˆ (strictly convex when  > 2).
21This is also supported by data. See [Coh10] for a literature review. I also provide some empirical
evidence in 4.1.
22The incumbent who loses this product line has total labor productivity (n′ − 1)z′, decreased from
n′z′.
23For a firm with very high productivity, it is reasonable to consider the possibility of lowered average
productivity as a result of new product development. For example, one can think of Amazon’s Fire
Phone, Google’s Google Glass or Google Plus, and Apple’s Newton. The cessation of these product
developments all increased the corresponding firm’s stock price.
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To derive the cost of external innovation, we take expectation over firm specific pro-
ductivity zˆ and obtain z¯nE(zˆ−1)kx = z¯nkx, because external R&D is undirected (by
construction, E(zˆ−1) =
∫ 1
0
zˆ−1j dj = 1). This implies that external R&D cost depends
only on the aggregate productivity24.
In total, a firm choosing innovation intensity kI and kx pays
R(kI , kx;n, z) ≡ z¯nRˆ(kI , kx; zˆ) ≡ z¯n[zˆ−1kI + kx] (2.13)
units of final goods for R&D expenditure.
2.4.3 Financial Frictions
In this model, R&D expenditure cannot exceed a multiple of profits, or equivalently cash
flow. This constraint is formally given by
R(kI , kx;n, z) ≤ ιΠ(n, z) (2.14)
where ι > 0 is the pledgeability of profits. ι =∞ corresponds to a perfect capital market.
Empirical studies have stressed the importance of internal finance (e.g., cash flow
or retailed earnings, both are related to profits), which has remained as the majority
(> 60%) source of funds for firms of all sizes [FHP06]. It is less affected by asymmetric
information concerns common in external financing25, and thus becomes essential for
R&D—a type of intangible investment with high uncertainty26.
Constraint (2.14) reflects the financial frictions (financial market imperfections) in
the economy. Without any friction, firms can borrow indefinitely and thus afford any
amount of R&D expenditure (i.e., ι =∞). When there is friction, a firm’s debt capacity
is limited. This limit is linked with firm profits in this model, because profits convey
information of a firm’s ability to generate cash flow and honor debt repayment27.
24In standard Schumpeterian models as [KK04], there is only external R&D and its cost is dependent
only on aggregate productivity. See also in footnote 8.
25See [MM84, Mye06] and many other related papers.
26See [BFP09, HL10, BP11, KN15].
27Also, the limit is only linked with profits, rather than a direct function of the sufficient statistics of
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Constraint (2.14) is analogous to the collateral constraints in the literature28, which
states that total debt cannot exceed a multiple of capital (i.e., collateral). Firms do not
possess capital in this model, so profit flows serve the purpose of collateral.
With (2.10) and (2.13), (2.14) can be simplified into z¯n[zˆ−1kI + kx] ≤ ιnz¯Azˆ−1/.
In other words,
kI + kx/zˆ
−1 ≤ ιA/. (2.15)
Immediate from (2.15), we can see that there are three ways for the financial constraint
to tighten: (1) decrease in aggregate demand A; (2) decrease in profit pledgeability ι;
and (3) decrease in relative productivity zˆ. The first two will affect every firm, while the
third only small firms (in zˆ).
2.4.4 Discussion of Size-Growth Relation
There are two counteracting forces affecting firm size-growth relation: one from the in-
novation function (2.12) and the other from the financial constraint (2.15).
If financial friction is low (due to high A or ι), R&D expenditure will not be restricted
by (2.15). Because of the diminishing return of n in (2.12), small firms (in n) grow faster
and thus the size-growth relation is negative. This is the case analyzed in [AK15].
In contrast, if the constraint (2.15) is tight, then small firms’ (in zˆ) innovation en-
deavors will be severely contained, while large firms’ (in zˆ) will be relatively unrestricted.
In addition, as firms lean toward internal innovation, which is perfectly scalable, small
firms further lose their comparative advantage in innovation. As a result, small firms
can no longer grow faster, and the economy features an independent (and even positive)
size-growth pattern.
Which of (2.12) or (2.15) prevails then depends on the severity of financial frictions,
as summarized by Figure 2.2. I will explore this result further in Section 2.5 and 2.6.
a firm: n and zˆ. One justification is that n and zˆ are not observable (or verifiable) due to information
frictions.
28[JQ12, Mol14, MX14, Gar16].
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Figure 2.2: Illustration of the Model Mechanism
2.4.5 Value Functions
To summarize, a firm can be characterized by the pair (n, zˆ): the number of product
lines and relative labor productivity. A firm’s value will also depends on the aggregate
productivity. Denote a firm’s value function by V(n, zˆ, z¯). It follows the following lemma
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Lemma 1 (Value Function). V(n, zˆ, z¯) = z¯V (n, zˆ) and
(r − g)V (n, zˆ) = max
kI ,kx
Anzˆ−1/︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit
−n(zˆ−1kI + kx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R&D cost
+ FI(kI)[V (n, zˆ(1 + λ))− V (n, zˆ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
return from internal R&D
+ nFx(kx, n)
[
Ezˆ′V (n+ 1,
nzˆ + zˆ′(1 + η)
n+ 1
)− V (n, zˆ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
return from external R&D
+ nτ [V (n− 1, zˆ)− V (n, zˆ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
creative destruction
− ∂V
∂zˆ
(n, zˆ)gzˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
change in zˆ
+ϕ
[
ιAzˆ−1/− kI zˆ−1 − kx
]
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
financial constraint
(2.16)
where τ is the equilibrium creative destruction rate, g = ˙¯z/z¯ and ϕ the Lagrangian mul-
tiplier of the financial constraint.
Proof. See Appendix 4.4 
Each incumbent firm maximizes its value by choosing R&D intensity kI and kx. The
first line on the right hand side of (2.16) is the operating profit over currently held product
lines net of R&D costs. The second line is the product of internal innovation Poisson
arrival rate FI(kI) and the change in firm value following internal innovation. The third
line denotes the return from external innovation. The fourth line shows the change in firm
value due to losing its product lines through creative destruction at Poisson rate τ . The
first item in the final line represents the change in firm value due to the change in zˆ ≡ z/z¯,
as z¯ grows at rate g. Lastly, we have the financial constraint faced by incumbents.
2.4.6 Entry and Exit
There is a unit measure of potential entrants. Each entrant has access to the external
innovation technology similar to (2.12), different only up to a scalar. An entrant chooses
an innovation flow rate xe > 0 with cost (in terms of final goods) νx
1
βx
e E[zˆ−1]z¯ = νx
1
βx
e z¯,
where ν > 0 captures the entry costs. Upon a successful innovation, the entrant replaces
an incumbent and starts producing intermediate goods. Denote the incumbent’s (relative)
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labor productivity as zˆ′; the new entrant’s productivity is (1 + η)zˆ′. Since innovation is
random, zˆ′ is drawn from the current (endogenous) distribution φ(zˆ).
Denote V (n, zˆ) as the value of having n product lines with relative productivity zˆ,
then entrants’ maximization problem is
max
xe
z¯
{
xeEzˆ′V (1, zˆ′(1 + η))− νx
1
βx
e ]
}
.
Entry rate xe then satisfies the free-entry condition
Ezˆ′V (1, zˆ′(1 + η))/ν = x
1
βx
−1
e . (2.17)
As in all Schumpeterian models, incumbents can lose some of their current product
lines to other firms through competition (a.k.a. creative destruction). A firm that loses
all product lines, i.e., n = 0, exits the economy.
2.4.7 Market Clearing and Stationary Distributions
I now close the model by specifying the market clearing conditions.
Final goods are used in consumption and innovation by incumbents and entrants. The
market of final goods satisfies
Y = C + z¯
∫
f∈M
nf Rˆ(kI , kx; zˆf )df + z¯νx
1
βx
e . (2.18)
In terms of labor market,
∫
f∈M
lfdf =
∫ 1
0
ljdj = 1. (2.19)
The equilibrium is also characterized by the stationary joint distribution of relative
productivity zˆ and firm size n. Denote the joint distribution by H(n, zˆ) = Prob(n˜ =
n, q ≤ zˆ). Its density h(n, zˆ) (and also the measure of firms M) satisfies the Kolmogorov
forward equation listed in Lemma 6 in Appendix 4.4. The marginal density of relative
productivity zˆ is then φ(zˆ) ≡∑∞n=1 h(n, zˆ).
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2.4.8 Aggregate Growth and Creative Destruction Rate
As shown in Appendix 4.3, the standard Euler equation states that
g =
C˙
C
=
Y˙
Y
=
˙¯z
z¯
=
r − ρ
θ
We can also characterize the growth rate g and creative destruction rate.
Lemma 2 (Aggregate Growth and Creative Destruction).
g =
external R&D︷ ︸︸ ︷
τ
[
(1 + η)−1 − 1]+ internal R&D︷ ︸︸ ︷Ezˆ {I(zˆ) [(zˆ(1 + λ))−1 − zˆ−1]}
− 1 . (2.20)
where I(zˆ) = M
∑∞
n=1 FI(kI(n, zˆ))h(n, zˆ)/φ(zˆ) is the internal innovation rate condi-
tional on being type zˆ firms, and M is the measure of incumbents.
The aggregate creative destruction rate is
τ = M
∞∑
n=1
∫ ∞
0
nFx(kx(n, zˆ))h(n, zˆ)dzˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
agg. external R&D rate
+ xe︸︷︷︸
entry
. (2.21)
Proof. See Appendix 4.4. 
Lemma 2 shows that growth comes from both internal and external innovation. Exter-
nal innovation is affected by the rate of creative destruction τ , which is jointly determined
by both incumbents’ and entrants’ R&D efforts. Equation (2.20) also implies that the
step sizes of R&D, η and τ , and the composition of internal/external R&D alter economic
growth.
2.4.9 Stationary Equilibrium and Welfare
Finally, we can summarize the equilibrium of the economy.
Definition 1. A stationary equilibrium consists of
{yj, pj, lj, V (n, zˆ), kx(n, zˆ), ki(n, zˆ), xe,M, h(n, zˆ), g, τ, r, w}
where
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• yj, pj and lj maximize profit as in (2.10)
• kx(n, zˆ) and kl(n, zˆ) maximize V (n, zˆ). xe solves entrants’ problem as in (2.17)
• wage w is consistent with (2.18) and (2.19)
• the interest rate r satisfies the Euler equation r = ρ+ θg
• The stationary distribution h(n, zˆ) and measure of firms M satisfy (4.4)
• g is given by (2.20)
• The creative destruction rate τ is given by (2.21)
Normalize the initial aggregate productivity level to one; the welfare is given by the
lifetime utility of the household
U(c0, g) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
c(t)1−θ − 1
1− θ dt =
1
1− θ
[
c1−θ0
ρ− (1− θ)g −
1
ρ
]
(2.22)
where
c0 = z¯
[
A−M
∫ ∞
0
∞∑
n=1
n(zˆ−1kI(n, zˆ) + kx(n, zˆ))dH(n, zˆ)− νx1/βxe
]
.
As in [AC15], I compare the consumption-equivalent change ξ along the balanced
growth path for two economies with g1, c10 and g
2, c20. ξ is defined as
U(ξc20, g
2) = U(c10, g
1).
The equilibrium29 is rather complex and has no analytic solution. In the next section,
I will derive some theoretical results to clarify the intuition of the model.
29Note that the competitive equilibrium is inefficient, as in all Shumpeterian models, because firms
do not fully internalize the positive externality of innovation. In addition, there is another source of
inefficiency from the business stealing effect of external innovation [AAH14]. However, these inefficiencies
are not the focus of this paper.
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2.5 Theoretical Results
This section provides some theoretical results from the model and shows that the model is
consistent with the three empirical facts documented in Section 2.3: (1) R&D growth rate
decreases when financial constraints tighten, more severely for small firms (Section 1.3);
(2) Constrained firms switch toward internal R&D (Section 1.4); and (3) The relation
between size and growth rate will approach zero (i.e., independent relation) from negative
when financial frictions increase (Section 2.3).
2.5.1 Firm Innovation and Financial Frictions
We have the following result regarding a firm’s innovation intensity.
Lemma 3 (Firm Innovation Strategies).
k∗I =
[
αIβI [V (n, zˆ(1 + λ))− V (n, zˆ)]
nzˆ−1(1 + ϕ)
] 1
1−βI
k∗x =
[
αxβx[Ezˆ′V (n+ 1, nzˆ+zˆ
′(1+η)
n+1
)− V (n, zˆ)]
n−γ(1 + ϕ)
] 1
1−βx
where ϕ is the shadow price of the constraint
ιAzˆ−1/ ≥ kI zˆ−1 + kx.
Proof. See Appendix 4.4 
The 1+ϕ term in the denominator indicates that, everything else constant, the tighter
the financial constrains (thus the higher the ϕ), the lower the innovation intensity kI and
kx. This is related to the empirical fact analyzed in Section 1.3.
The next result pertains to Section 1.4.
Proposition 1 (Shift toward Internal Innovation). The ratio of internal to external
innovation intensity kI
kx
is increasing in ϕ (decreasing in ι) when ϕ > 0.
Proof. From Lemma 3, we have kI
kx
∝ (1 + ϕ) 11−βx− 11−βI . Then the proposition follows
naturally from βx > βI . See Appendix 4.4 for details. 
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Figure 2.3: Shift to Internal Innovation
Recall that βI and βx are the elasticities of R&D production functions from equation
(2.11) and (2.12). βx > βI indicates that the success rate of developing new products
is more sensitive to R&D inputs than internal innovation (the intuition is included in
the texts after Equation (2.12)). Therefore, when total R&D expenditures drop, internal
R&D will decrease more than external R&D. The ratio kI/kx will then decrease. Figure
2.3 illustrates the intuition.
The shift in the composition of R&D types has implications on the aggregate growth
rate (see Lemma 2) and firm size-growth relation. The latter arises from the fact that
internal R&D has constant return to n, so small firms are deprived of their advantages
in innovation when they are forced to perform more internal innovation.
2.5.2 Firm Growth Rate and Financial Frictions
The section shows that the size-growth relation depends on financial frictions, relating
to Section 2.3. From the equilibrium characterization in Appendix 4.3, a firm’s size
measured by employment is proportional to nzˆ−1 ≡ Qf . Accordingly, firm growth is
equivalent to the growth of Qf . We have the following definition:
Definition 2 (Firm Growth Rate). gf ≡ E
(
Q˙f/Qf
)
is the average growth rate of a firm
with nzˆ−1 ≡ Qf . gf is characterized by Lemma 5 in Appendix 4.4.
The relation between gf and size Qf (i.e.,
∂gf
∂Q
) depends on two opposing forces, as
discussed in Section 2.4.4. On the one hand, the diminishing return of external R&D
with respect to n (a.k.a. imperfect scalablility) works in favor of smaller firms (small in
n). On the other, the financial constraint works against smaller firms (small in zˆ). Which
force prevails depends on the severity of financial frictions (ι and A).
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To clarify the intuition, consider myopic firms as in [AHS13], where firms consider
only the current and immediate next period’s profits, Π(n, zˆ). Also set  = 2 (linear
profit function), γ = −1 (extreme inscalability) and normalize A = 1.
As shown in Appendix 4.5, when the financial constraint is not binding, i.e., ϕ = 0,
gf =
Cx
n
2−βx
1−βx zˆ
+ CI − τ , where Cx and CI are two constants30. Therefore ∂gf∂Q < 0. This is
the case analyzed in [AK15], in which smaller firms grow faster where only the first force,
i.e., imperfect scalability, is at work.
However, when ϕ > 0, the sign of
∂gf
∂Q
is ambiguous (dependent on ϕ). When
∂gf
∂Q
= 0,
we will return to the case [KK04] where the growth rate follows Gibrat’s law and is
independent of size.
The above result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Firm Growth Rate and Financial Frictions). Consider myopic firms with
 = 2, γ = −1.
• When the financial constraint is not binding, i.e., ϕ = 0, gf = Cx
n
2−βx
1−βx zˆ
+ CI − τ ,
where Cx and CI are two constants. The relation between size and growth rate is
negative.
∂gf
∂Q
< 0
• When ϕ > 0, the size-growth relation is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix 4.5. 
2.6 Quantitative Analysis
This section estimates the parameters in the model using Simulated Method of Moments
(SMM) and performs counterfactual and policy analysis.
30Cx = αx(1 + η)(αxβx(1 + η))
βx
1−βx and CI = λαI(αIβIλ)
βI
1−βI .
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2.6.1 Equilibrium Solution
Solving this model is challenging. The introduction of financial constraints (2.14) signifi-
cantly increases the complexity of the model. For Schumpeterian models31, a firm’s value
function is usually separable in terms of firms’ different product lines. In other words,
production (and innovation) on each product line is independent. However, the financial
constraint is global, because it is determined by firm-wide profits and R&D expenditures.
In addition, methods such as finite-difference are typically computationally inefficient
in this model. The main reason is that in external innovation, zˆ is not contained to
movement around its neighborhood32: it spans the whole distribution support according
to zˆ → nzˆ
n+1
+ zˆ
′(1+η)
n+1
.
The value function V (n, zˆ) (2.16) directly depends on the distribution of relative pro-
ductivity φ(zˆ), instead of a single-dimensional equilibrium variable (e.g., prices). Further-
more, the joint distribution of number of product lines and relative productivity h(n, zˆ)
is determined by a complex system of delay integral-differential equations (see Lemma 6
in Appendix 4.4), which, in turn, are affected by firm value functions (firm choices).
To calculate the joint distribution, I discretize the state-space of n and zˆ into a
grid33. The discretized version of density h(n, zˆ) is the stationary distribution of a dis-
crete Markov chain, of which the transition matrix depends on the firm’s innovation
choices: Firms move up and down along n or zˆ dimension within the grid with reflective
boundaries. Given the joint distribution, φ(zˆ) is represented by a discretized probability
distribution (I use 108 grid points for zˆ). The details are in Appendix 4.6.1.
The value function is approximated by a 3-layer neural network V (n, zˆ, g, τ, φ(zˆ),Ω).
Ω are the 9 to-be-estimated parameters (explained later). The total input dimension
is 121. The calculation of value functions is similar to [Dua18]. It explicitly requires
the convergence of the Hamiltonian-Jacobian-Bellman (HJB) equation. Note the solu-
tion of V (n, zˆ, g, τ, φ(zˆ),Ω) is a function, so we can easily compute the value given any
combination of its inputs without performing the value function iteration again.
31Such as [LM08, AHS13] and [AK15].
32Technically, the HJB equation will not produce a sparse matrix. See [AAM17]
33As in [AHS13], I impose upper bounds on n and zˆ (10 and 6) in the numerical solution.
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Table 2.4: Calibrated Parameters
Description Value Notes
ρ Discount rate 0.02 Annual discount factor 0.97
θ Inverse of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution 2.00 [AAA17]
 Elasticity of substitution between products 2.90 [AAA17]
A Production function scalar 1.00 Normalized
I employ the Python packages TensorFlow and Keras to train the neural network
(reinforcement learning). The details are given in Appendix 4.6.2.
The overall algorithm is summarized below.
Algorithm Overview
1. Calculate the neural network approximiation of value function V (n, zˆ, g, τ, φ(zˆ),Ω)
and thus innovation rates I(n, zˆ) = FI(kI(n, zˆ)) andX(n, zˆ) = nx(n, zˆ) = nFx(kx(n, zˆ), n).
2. Find the equilibrium for any given parameters Ω.
(a) Guess equilibrium g and τ
• Guess relative productivity distribution φ(zˆ)
• Calculate innovation rates using the value functions
• Calculate the stationary joint distribution h(n, zˆ; g, τ,Ω)
• Update φ(zˆ)
• Repeat until φ(zˆ) converges.
(b) Update g′ and τ ′ according to (2.20) and (2.21).
(c) Solve the fixed points of g′ = Fg(g, τ ; Ω) and τ ′ = Fτ (g, τ ; Ω), where Fg and
Fτ denote the functions that return the updated value g
′ and τ ′. This step is
solved using the Python non-linear function solver.
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Table 2.5: Estimated Parameters
Parameter Description Estimated value
βI Internal innovation elasticity 0.408
βx External innovation elasticity 0.471
αx External innovation scalar 0.501
αI Internal innovation scalar 6.483
η External innovation step size 0.099
λ Internal innovation step size 0.018
γ External innovation scalability -0.463
ν Entry cost scalar 2.482
ι Profit pledgeability scalar 5.76e-4
2.6.2 Estimation
This section presents the estimation procedure of model parameters. Four parameters
listed in Table 2.4 are externally calibrated to values common in the literature. The
remaining nine parameters in Table 2.5, or Ω, are estimated by matching data moments.
I use Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) to estimate the parameters. Define Γ(Y)
and Γ(Ω) to be the data (Y) moments and simulation moments. The estimator minimizes
Ωˆ = argmin
Ω
[Γ(Y)− Γ(Ω)]TW[Γ(Y)− Γ(Ω)]
where W is a diagonal weighting matrix with Wii = 1/Γi(Y)
2 and Wij = 0 for i 6= j
. The aggregate growth rate’s weight is increased by a factor of three [AHS13]. The
simulated moments Γ(Ω) are calculated by Monte Carlo with 5,000 firms.
All parameters are identified jointly. The next subsection provides a heuristic discus-
sion on identification.
2.6.2.1 Empirical Moments and Identification
In the model, size is jointly determined by n and zˆ. Revenue, profit and employment
are linear in Qf = nzˆ
−1. Since total employment lf = Qf in equilibrium, I will use
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employment as the size measure.
Growth Regression Coefficient Γ1
The empirical regression is given by Table 2.1. In simulation, it is the regression of
firm growth rate gf (Qf ) on log(Qf ) ≡ log(nzˆ−1). As mentioned in the theoretical section
2.5, Γ1 is particularly sensitive to γ and ι.
Firm Entry Rate Γ2
Due to data limitation (no Census data), I will use the annual average firm death rate
from Business Dynamics Statistics34. Entry rate is estimated as the annual average of
employment share of age 0 & 1 firms. The model equivalent is xeE(zˆ1−). Entry rate will
discipline ν, η, ι, αx and βx.
Aggregate Labor Productivity Growth Rate Γ3
The aggregate labor productivity is calculated as real total value-added per worker.
Value-added is the difference between net sales and cost of goods sold. Growth rates are
computed as geometric averages. It is particularly affected by τ and innovation step sizes
η and λ, as shown in equation (2.20).
Firm Growth Rate by Size Γ4,Γ5
They are defined as the averaged annual growth rates of total employment for firms
larger or smaller than median size in the sample. They are informative in determining γ,
τ , η and λ and innovation production function. The expression of gf (Qf ) is given by 4.3
in Lemma 5.
Firm Relative Productivity Growth Rate by Size Γ6,Γ7
The model equivalent is E[Iλ + nx (1+η)zˆ
′/zˆ−1
n+1
] − g, where I and x are (firm-specific)
Poisson arrival rates of internal and external R&D.
Internal Innovation Ratio by Size Γ8
I define Γ8 as the ratio of internal innovation share between large and small firms,
where internal innovation share is proxy by the share of internal patents using a fuzzy
30% cutoff. It corresponds to E( FI
nFx+FI
) in the model.
34https://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/data_firm.html. I exclude sectors 00-09
(AGR Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing) and 60 (FIRE Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate). The
time series plot is included in Appendix 4.2
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Table 2.6: Model and Data Moments
Moments Data Model
Growth regression coefficient -0.034 -0.040
Entry employment share 0.055 0.049
Aggregate labor productivity growth rate 0.030 0.027
Small firm employment growth 0.076 0.087
Large firm employment growth 0.063 0.045
Small firm productivity growth 0.069 0.091
Large firm productivity growth 0.009 0.006
Small/large firm internal patent share ratio 0.542 0.671
Small/large firm R&D intensity ratio 2.474 2.968
Innovation Intensity by Size Γ9
Innovation intensity is measured as R&D expenditure to net sales ratio, or (kI +
kxzˆ
1−)/A. Γ9 is informative on innovation production function parameters, ι and γ
2.6.2.2 Model Fit
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.6. The simulated moments match the em-
pirical counterparts relatively well.
Besides targeted moments, I also compare the untargeted moments, namely relative
productivity distribution and firm size distribution.
The model produces relative productivity35 distribution similar to the empirical one,
shown in Figure 2.4. On the left panel, I plot the distribution for each three years
throughout the sample periods. It shows a stable distribution over time, even considering
that the sample spans both the early 2000s Dot-Com bubble and the Great Recession.
The model, however, cannot fully match the left tail of the empirical distribution. One
explanation is that the Compustat dataset does not contain enough small firms. Also,
the model does not feature fixed operation cost or exogenous exits, so the survival rates
35Relative productivity zˆi = zi/z¯. z¯ = Total real value added/Total employment. Same for zi.
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Figure 2.4: Relative Productivity Distribution
(a) Data (b) Model
Figure 2.5: Firm Size Distribution (Normalized to Unit Mean)
(a) Data (b) Model
(and growth rates) of small firms can be higher from the simulation36.
The simulated firm size distribution also resembles its empirical counterpart as in
Figure 2.5. In both the data and model, firm size is defined as total employment, or
nzˆ−1. To make the two comparable, I normalize both distributions to have unit mean.
The empirical distribution takes the shape of a Pareto distribution, consistent with the
literature (e.g., [KK04]). The simulated one has less mass concentrated on the left tail,
which is inherited from the relative productivity distribution in Figure 2.5(b).
36/This is also apparent in Table 2.6. Compared to the empirical moments, the model generates higher
(lower) growth rates (in both employment and productivity) for small (large) firms. The simulated growth
coefficient, −0.040, is also more negative.
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Figure 2.6: Firm Size and Value Function
(a) Firm Size (b) Value Function
2.6.2.3 Characterization of the Economy
In this section, I will discuss some properties from the simulated economy.
Value Function
For illustration, I plot the relation between size and (n, zˆ) in Figure 2.6, which is deter-
mined by Q = nzˆ−1.
A firm’s value function, V (n, zˆ) in Equation (2.16), is plotted in Figure 2.6. V (n, zˆ)
is increasing in both the number of product lines n and relative productivity zˆ.
Innovation Rate
Figure 2.7 depicts the innovation policy function for different n and zˆ. External innovation
rate per product line37, Fx(n, zˆ) = αxk
βx
x n
γ, is shown in the left panel. Across the n-axis,
Fx decreases as the number of product lines increases. This reflects the comparative
advantage in external innovation for firms with fewer product lines, captured by the nγ
term in the model.
Along the zˆ-axis, we see an inverted-U shape of Fx. The upwar-sloping fraction
results from the financial frictions that R&D expenses cannot exceed a multiple of profits,
ιAzˆ−1/ ≥ kI zˆ−1 + kx. Therefore, given n, higher zˆ will relax the constraint, enabling
37The external innovation intensity kx(n, zˆ) shows a similar pattern.
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Figure 2.7: Innovation Rate
(a) External Innovation Rate (b) Internal Innovation Share
more R&D and a higher innovation rate. This is a countervailing force against the
inscalability of external innovation. It works in favor of firms large in terms of zˆ.
The downward-sloping part comes from the fact that after a successful external in-
novation, a firm’s productivity zˆ updates according to zˆ → nzˆ
n+1
+ zˆ
′(1+η)
n+1
. A firm with
very high zˆ is unlikely to obtain a higher zˆ′, and thus the benefit of external innovation
diminishes. This is the dilution effect analyzed in Section 2.4.2.2.
The internal innovation share, FI(n,zˆ)
FI(n,zˆ)+nFx(n,zˆ)
, is shown on the right panel of Figure 2.7.
Consistent with observations from the external innovation rate, smaller firms in terms
of n have higher internal innovation share, similar to [AK15]. We also see a U-shaped
relation between zˆ and internal innovation share.
2.6.3 Counterfactual and Policy Analysis
In this section, I will perform several counterfactual analyses and policy experiments to
quantify the implications of financial frictions, and to suggest how to design appropriate
policies.
2.6.3.1 Quantifying Financial Constraints
The Great Recession is a period with sizable change in financial markets and aggregate
economy. In Section 2.3, I have shown evidence that firm innovation and growth rate
were affected by the crisis. I will now first quantify the change in financial constraints
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after the Great Recession, and then evaluate its implications.
From (2.15), constraints can become more severe for all firms when A or ι decreases.
I refer to the changes to ι and A as profit pledgeability and aggregate demand shocks38.
Frictionless Counterfactual
As a benchmark, I consider the case where the financial constraint never binds, i.e.,
ι =∞. The result is shown in Table 2.8. The productivity growth rate g is increased to
0.035, and the negative relation between firm size and growth rate (β) is more significant.
The total welfare (in consumption-variation terms, see Equation (2.22)) increases slightly
by 10.2% compared to the baseline case39.
Decrease in Pledgeability ι
In the model, the financial friction is given by
Rt(kI , kx;n, z) ≤ ιΠt(n, z).
In other words, Rt(kI ,kx;n,z)
Πt(n,z)
≤ ι. Motivated by the model, I estimate the ι for each
sample period (1997-2006, 2007-2016) by
ι¯ =
1
T
∑
t
1
Nt
∑
i
R&D expensesit/Cash Flowi,t−1. (2.23)
Cash Flowi,t−1 is defined the same as it is in the empirical regression (1.1). The
estimated ι are listed in Table 2.7. So in the counterfactual analysis, I consider the case
where ι is decreased by 5%.
Table 2.8 shows the equilibrium outcome after a 5% decrease in ι. The aggregate
labor productivity growth rate drops by 0.6 percentage points compared to the baseline
scenario. The relation between growth rates and firm sizes also weakens to −0.020.
38Even though I use the term “shocks,” I do not perform impulse response analysis. Instead, I compare
stationary equilibria (balanced growth paths) after permanent change in parameter values.
39Note that higher growth rates from more innovation efforts also entail higher R&D costs and thus
less to consume.
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Table 2.7: Estimation of Change in ιt
1997-2006 2007-2016 % Change
Average 0.325 0.311 -4.6%
SD 0.037 0.018
a. R&D expensesit/Cash Flowi,t−1 are winsorized at
5% and 95% by year. Cash Flowi,t−1 is calculated as
income before extraordinary items plus depreciation
and amortization.
Welfare also suffers a 8.6% decrease. However, both the growth rate g and coefficient β
are still higher than those from the 2007-2016 data.
Decrease in aggregate demand A
I now consider a drop in A by the same magnitude 5%40. The consequence now is
more severe than a 5% ι drop. The growth rate is now 0.9 percentage points lower
and welfare 23.0% less. Also, the growth rate difference between large and small firms,
measured by β, is significantly smaller at −0.007. One possible explanation is that A
affects not only the financing constraint, but also the profit flow pi = nz¯Azˆ−1/ and
thus firm values. Reduced firm values depress both innovation, internal and external,
and firm entry. Furthermore, smaller A also directly reduces final output from Equation
(2.6). This result signifies the importance of boosting aggregate demand in recessions in
addition to restoring a well-functioning financial system.
Decrease in both ι and A
More likely than not, both the financial market and aggregate demand worsened during
the Great Recession. When both ι and A are reduced to 95% of their baseline levels, the
aggregate productivity growth g is 0.010, very close to the actual 0.009 measured in the
data. Similarly, beta is -0.006, within the 95% confidence interval, (−0.014,−0.004), of
40To put this into perspective, during the Great Recession, employment dropped by 6.7%, output by
7.2% and consumption by 5.4% in the United States from 2007 Q4 to 2009 Q3.
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Table 2.8: Counterfactual Analysis
iota A Beta g Welfare
Baseline ι¯ 1 -0.040 0.027 100
Frictionless ∞ 1 -0.060 0.035 110.2
Decrease in profit pledgeability 0.95ι¯ 1 -0.020 0.021 91.4
Decrease in aggregate demand ι¯ 0.95 -0.007 0.018 87.0
Decrease in both 0.95ι¯ 0.95 -0.006 0.010 77.2
1997-2006 Data -0.034 0.030
2007-2016 Data -0.009 0.009
a. The baseline model is estimated using 1997-2006 data. In the frictionless case,
ι =∞.
b. Beta refers to the regression coefficient of firm log employment on the firm em-
ployment growth rate. g is the aggregate labor productivity growth rate. The
baseline welfare is normalized to 100.
that estimated from the data. The welfare loss is approximately 22.8% compared to the
baseline economy.
2.6.4 R&D Subsidy
Given the 5% decrease in both ι and A, I consider two types of R&D subsidies aiming
to relax the financing constraint. Denote the (firm-specific) subsidy rate by sf . The
financing constraint with subsidy is now
ιAzˆ−1
(1− sf ) ≥ kI zˆ
−1 + kx. (2.24)
The contemporaneous after-R&D profit flow is Azˆ−1/−n(1− sf )(kI zˆ−1 + kx). The
subsidy is financed by a lump-sum tax T to the shareholders , i.e., the representative
household where T = z¯
∫
f
sfnf Rˆ(kI , kx; zˆf )df .
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Uniform Subsidy
As both ι and A decrease by 5%, I consider a simple policy that every firm receives a 10%
subsidy to their R&D. Table 2.9 presents the results. Both the welfare and aggregate
growth rate g are now much higher than before the subsidy. The size-growth relation
also favors smaller firms more with β = −0.012, compared to −0.006 without subsidies.
Intuitively, this is because now the financing constraint is essentially restored to the
baseline case41. Nevertheless, all metrics are still worse than the baseline economy, since
deteriorated aggregate demand will negatively affect firm values and welfare.
Size-dependent Subsidy
As advocated in the literature as well as implemented in practice (see for example
[AAA17]), smaller firms should receive higher subsidy, as they are more susceptible to
demand fluctuation and financial market imperfections. Here I consider a size-dependent
policy where the average subsidy is still 10%. In particular, let
sf = s(Qf ) = 1− 1/(a+ bQmin
Qf
) (2.25)
where Qf = nzˆ
−1 and Qmin = minf∈[0,M ] Qf . Note that 11−s(Qf ) = a+ b
Qmin
Qf
. Also,
∞∑
n=1
∫ ∞
0
s(Q)dH(n, zˆ) = 10%
s(Qmax) = 0.
Although in the theoretical model, Qmax =∞, in the numerical solution, I set Qmax =
nmaxzˆ
−1
max. Also, I set H(n, zˆ) to be the distribution of the no-subsidy economy, so a more
appropriate interpretation is that the ex-ante subsidy is 10%. a and b are two parameters,
calculated to be 1.099980 and 35.132840 respectively.
As shown in Table 2.9, there is a modest improvement compared to the uniform sub-
sidy case, albeit still less than the baseline scenario for the same reason discussed before.
Consistent with the literature, a size-dependent subsidy is more effective than a uniform
41 To see this, note that 0.95 ∗ 0.95/0.9 ≈ 1.0028
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Table 2.9: Policy Analysis
Beta g Welfare
Uniform subsidy -0.012 0.015 82.3
Size-dependent subsidy -0.019 0.019 88.5
a. In both cases, ι and A decrease by 5% compared to the
baseline case in Table 2.8.
one, considering smaller firms are associated with higher innovation capacity [AK15]. The
improvement is less pronounced than in other estimates. Some studies further differenti-
ate innovation efficiency among firms within the same size group (e.g., compare large-old,
large-young, small-old and small-young firms). Other models introduce taxation on large
but inefficient incumbents [AC15, AAA17]. Still other papers relate subsidy directly with
firm productivity [Akc08]. In this paper, a large firm is not necessarily more productive,
as firm size Q is a function of both the number of product lines n and productivity zˆ.
Interestingly, even with this crude measure of size, size-dependent R&D policy still yields
better results.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper, I build a Schumpeterian growth model with financial frictions. Firms are
financially constrained so that their R&D spending cannot exceed a multiple of profits.
Depending on the severity of the constraint, size-growth relation can be negative or
independent. Two opposite forces are at work. One the one hand, the diminishing return
of R&D to the number of product lines generates higher growth for small firms when
financial constraints are slack. On the other, firms with low productivity, which also
makes them small in size, find it more difficult to conduct R&D, for R&D expenditure is
increasing at the aggregate level of productivity. Which force dominates depends on the
tightness of financial constraints.
The model is also consistent with three observations from the data. Smaller firm
R&D growth rates drop more precipitously during the Great Recession. Financially
constrained firms switch to internal innovation, measured by a higher share of internal
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patents. In addition, the relation between size and growth rate for U.S. public innovative
firms change from negative to statistically insignificant after 2007. The latter two are
analyzed by panel regression, and are robust to various econometric models, variable
definitions, identification strategies and sample selection.
Due to the complexity of the equilibrium, the model is solved using reinforced learning
techniques. In particular, the state space of the value function is expanded to include firm-
specific state variables, aggregate endogenous variables, to-be-estimated parameters and
discretized aggregate productivity distribution. Then I approximate the value function
by a neural network.
The financial constraint can tighten because of either reduction in profit pledgeability
or drop in aggregate demand. Accordingly, I test three adverse scenarios: a 5% drop in
pledgeability, a 5% drop in aggregate demand or both. The second case shows a larger
decrease in growth rate and welfare, while the third one matches the empirical growth
rate and size-growth relation, suggesting that the Great Recession is likely a combination
of financial and demand shocks.
Lastly, I consider two R&D policies. In one every firm receives the same rate of R&D
subsidy (uniform) while in the other small firms obtain higher subsidies, but both policies
have the same average subsidy rate of 10%. The size-dependent policy yields a higher
growth rate and higher welfare improvement.
There are several extensions possible for future research. First, I consider only perma-
nent change in model parameters. Since the Great Recession left a long-lasting impact
on the economy and firms were unclear of the persistence of shocks at the time, it is
not inappropriate to simplify the analysis and consider a permanent shift, but it will
be interesting to study the transition dynamics as well. Second, if firm-level data are
available, one can also examine how financial development affects the growth of small
firms in a cross-country setting. Lastly, as in [AAA17], a more comprehensive analy-
sis should incorporate fixed operating costs, resources (mis)allocation and more complex
R&D policies.
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CHAPTER 3
Bank Profitability and Financial Stability
Jointly with with TengTeng Xu, and Udaibir S. Das1
3.1 Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009 and the ensuing period of low interest
rates have renewed interest among policy makers on the importance of bank profitability
for financial stability. Despite the subsequent recovery, the return on equity of many
banks remains below the cost of equity. With valuations below the balance sheet value
of banks2, the market’s assessment of banks’ ability to overcome profitability challenges
is not optimistic.
The existing literature on bank profitability and its impact on financial stability re-
ports mixed evidence. First, on profitability and risks, some researchers found that
higher profitability leads to higher charter value (i.e., long-term expected profitability)
and therefore less risk-taking by banks ([Kee90, BKT09]). Others suggest that high
profitability could loosen leverage constraints and lead to more risk-taking ([MRV16]).
Furthermore, high profits in good times could be an indicator of systemic tail risk in bad
times ([MNP18]). Second, there is mixed evidence on the impact of non-interest income
(NII) on risks ([BDV07, EHH10]). More recently, some researchers found that the impact
on financial stability depends on the type of non-interest income ([Koh14, DT13]).
1IMF Working Paper No. 19/5. See link https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/
2019/01/11/Bank-Profitability-and-Financial-Stability-46470. We are grateful to John Ca-
parusso, Martin Cihak, Ehsan Ebrahimy, Javier Hamann, Fei Han, Mindaugas Leika, Graeme Littler,
Hiroko Oura, Yizhi Xu, and the participants of the IMF’s MCM Quantum Seminar for useful feedback.
All remaining errors are our own.
2The low profitability of banks has been highlighted recently in the IMF’s Global Financial Stability
Reports (October 2016, 2017) and IMF led Financial Sector Assessment Programs (Euro Area 2018,
Spain 2017, Japan 2017, Germany 2016, and Ireland 2016).
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Motivated by such mixed evidence, this paper investigates the theoretical and empir-
ical relationships between bank profitability and financial stability, taking into account
bank business models (e.g., retail vs. wholesale orientation) and different types of NII ac-
tivities. In this regard, we analyze not only the link between the level of bank profitability
and financial stability, but also the deeper question of how the source of bank profitability
affects financial stability. Several measures of bank business models and characteristics
shed light on the source of bank profitability. For example: the NII share and the loan-to-
asset (LTA) ratio provide insights on banks’ reliance on NII and non-traditional business
or activities; the deposit-to-liability ratio captures the extent to which banks rely on
wholesale funding to cut costs on the liability side of the balance sheet3; the leverage
ratio in part reflects banks’ risk-taking behavior and the risks undertaken by banks to
generate income; and competition measures such as the Lerner index of a firm’s market
power captures the extent to which banks rely on mark-up and market power to make
profits.
This paper begins by setting out a stylized theoretical model that underpins the
analytical relationship between bank profitability and financial stability by explicitly
capturing the role of NII and retail-oriented business models. In this model, banks
choose the amount of retail-oriented and market-oriented NII activities4 to maximize
expected equity values, given the risk profile of these activities. The key mechanism in
our theoretical model is the complementarity between retail-oriented NII activities and
bank lending. When the LTA ratio is high, banks are more inclined to engage in retail-
oriented NII activities given the existing retail client base. On the other hand, when the
LTA ratio is low, banks may choose to engage in market-oriented NII activities which
tend to be riskier and providing limited diversification benefit from a financial stability
prospective.
The theoretical model predicts that idiosyncratic risk, defined as the value-at-risk
(VaR) of equity and the expected default frequency (EDF) proxy, decreases as both
3While wholesale funding provided cost savings prior to the crisis, there is some evidence that it
became more expensive than retail funding after the crisis in some countries.
4Market-oriented business lines include underwriting, trade execution commissions, and investment-
banking service. Retail-oriented business includes payment services fees, insurance commissions, and
fiduciary income. The risk and return profile depend on the specific NII activity. For a summary of
stylized facts, see [Sti02].
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short-term book profitability (i.e., return on average assets, or ROAA) and long-term
expected profitability (i.e., charter value) rise. Profits reduce risks by providing equity
buffers and encouraging prudence, thereby reducing risk-taking. In addition, when the
LTA ratio is below a certain threshold, idiosyncratic risk increases as the NII share5 rises.
We derive testable hypotheses on the relationship among bank profitability, business
models, and financial stability.
In the empirical analysis, we apply dynamic panel regression approaches to examine
the determinants of financial stability and profitability, and test the hypotheses derived
from the theoretical model. Financial stability is captured by both idiosyncratic and
systemic risk measures. Idiosyncratic risk is measured by market-based risk measures,
including the historical VaR of equity prices and Moody’s EDF, while the contribution to
systemic risk is measured by the delta CoVaR ([AB16]). Bank profitability is measured
by ROAA, ROAE (return on average equity), risk-adjusted returns, and the price-to-
book ratio (a proxy for charter value). In our analysis, we not only control for business
model measures, but also more generally, bank characteristics, structural and cyclical
conditions, as well as monetary and fiscal policy variables. In our empirical analysis,
we examine the “average” relationship between bank profitability, business models, and
financial stability from 2004 to 2017, capturing both crisis and normal times. In this
sense, our analysis is more general compared with papers that focus on crisis episodes
alone. We focus our attention on 431 publicly traded banks as we capture market-based
measures of bank profitability and financial stability.
Empirical results reveal several important interactions among bank profitability, busi-
ness models, and financial stability, and confirm the hypotheses from the theoretical
model. First, profitability (ROAA) and the price-to-book ratio are negatively associated
with both the contribution to systemic risk (∆CoV aR) and idiosyncratic risks measured
by the VaR (95 percent6) and the EDF of banks. Second, a high NII share tends to be
associated with higher idiosyncratic and contribution to systemic risks when the LTA
is low (i.e., when a bank’s business model is less retail-oriented), as predicted by our
theoretical model. Third, low competition is associated with lower idiosyncratic risk but
5The NII share is defined as the ratio of NII to operating income.
6We define VaR as the 95% quantile of “loss”, which is the inverse of rate of return.
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higher contribution to systemic risk. In addition, our results confirm that high leverage
and an over-reliance on wholesale funding are associated with higher idiosyncratic and
contribution to systemic risks.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on bank profitability and financial
stability from both theoretical and empirical perspectives7. Theoretically, this paper
provides one of the first models to pin down the analytical relationship between risks and
bank profitability, accounting for the interaction between NII and retail-oriented business
models. Most papers focus on a narrow set of NII activities, especially market-oriented
ones such as securitization and trading (e.g., [SV10, BR16]), yet fee-based traditional
retail-oriented business is another crucial component of NII. In our model, we consider
both retail-based and market-based NII and the distinction is general in nature: only
the former is complementary with respect to bank lending. We then derive explicitly
the impact of bank profitability, the NII share, and the LTA ratio on idiosyncratic risks
measured by VaR and EDF.
The empirical contribution of our paper is three-fold. First, the paper is one of the
first comprehensive empirical analysis on the determinants of bank idiosyncratic risks and
their contribution to systemic risks, accounting for bank profitability, business models,
structural and cyclical conditions, and policy responses during recent crises. Second, we
contribute to the empirical literature on NII and their financial stability implications by
explicitly controlling for retail vs. wholesale business models in a cross-country setting
without reliance on confidential supervisory data. Earlier papers either used detailed
supervisory data or categorize NII according to local accounting standards in country-
specific studies (e.g., [Koh14, DT13]). In this paper, using an interaction term between
share of NII and the LTA ratio, we are able to control for the type of NII activities
and bank business models in a cross-country setting, even when accounting standards
differ across countries8. Third, we examine the relationship between the forward-looking
measure of risks (EDF) and bank profitability empirically. Earlier literature has largely
7A literature survey on the determinants of risks and bank profitability can be found in Appendix
5.1.
8Furthermore, publicly available data sources such as the S&P Global Market Intelligence’s SNL
database and Fitch Connect do not provide further breakdown on the type of NII and loans in a consistent
manner across countries, in part, due to different accounting standards and reporting requirements among
countries.
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focused on backward-looking measures ([DT13]).
Finally, our paper contributes to policy discussions on the role of bank profitability
for financial stability. The results demonstrate that the source and the sustainability
of bank profitability has important financial stability implications, as an over-reliance
on market-based NII activities, leverage, and wholesale funding is associated with higher
idiosyncratic risk and contribution to systemic risk. Furthermore, the impact of bank con-
solidation on competition should be addressed in policy discussions, as low competition
is associated with a high contribution to systemic risk.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first present a stylized theoretical
model on the relationship between profitability and financial stability in Section 3.2.
Section 3.3 presents the data, stylized facts, and the empirical methodology. We then
discuss the empirical findings on the determinants of risk and bank profitability in Section
3.4. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks and discuss policy implications in Section
3.5.
3.2 Bank Profitability and Risks: A Stylized Theoretical Model
To anchor analytical relationships between bank profitability and financial stability, we
outline below a stylized model accounting for bank business models. The focus of the
model is to capture both retailed-based and market-based NII activities, and the non-
linear impact of NII on banking risks. To keep it tractable and focused, we abstract
from modelling a dynamic programming problem, as it is not essential for capturing the
stylized relationships among bank profitability, business models, and financial stability.
3.2.1 Model Setup
Bank Balance Sheet
In the stylized theoretical model, we consider a static setting of a representative risk-
neutral bank with the following balance sheet structure:
The balance sheet constraint is given by
L+Nr +Nm = D + E ≡ A (3.1)
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Assets Liabilities
L D
Nr E
Nm
where Nm stands for the assets related to market-based NII activities, such as un-
derwriting, trade commissions, and investment-banking services, and Nr captures retail-
based NII activities, such as payment services fees, insurance commissions, lending service
fees, and fiduciary income. Nr and Nm are the assets devoted to NII activities at the
beginning of the period9. L represents loans, D deposits, E equity, and A bank assets.
For simplicity and tractability, we assume D,L and E to be exogenous, and that the
capital constraint is binding, E = eA, where e is the reciprocal of the leverage ratio. The
assumption that L is exogenous is not unreasonable in our stylized model, as L can be
regarded as a proxy for the retail customer base of a bank and typically cannot change
quickly. Similar reasoning is applied to equity E by assuming some equity issuance costs
or frictions.
Bank Profit Function and Shocks
The bank’s profit function is given as
Π˜ = (1− x)r˜LL+ r˜mNm + r˜rNαr L1−α − cmNm − crNr − cfA− r (3.2)
where tilde notation denotes random variables, and returns are normally distributed as
r˜i ∼ N(ri, σ2i ) with i = L,m, r. For simplicity, we assume r˜i are mutually independent10.
cm, cr, and cf are cost parameters where cm < rm. rD is the deposit rate and x denotes
the problem loan ratio. The deposit rate rD can be viewed as funding cost in our stylized
model.
A key structure in the model is the Cobb-Douglas production function Nαr L
1−α of
9For example, if retail-based NII includes payment service fees, then Nr represents the payment
network or system’s assets (e.g., ATMs, software, machinery).
10This assumption is not important and will not alter the main results. For details, please refer to the
discussions after proposition 2.
61
retail-based NII activities11. It ensures homogeneity of degree one with respect to inputs
L and Nr, as well as the complementarity between retail-based lending business L, and
retail-based NII activities Nr. The complementarity is motivated by the fact that most
retail-based NII activities share the same customer base (and some employee skills) as
the lending business.
Bank Objective Function
The bank’s objective function is given by
max
Nm,Nr
E(Π˜) + E (3.3)
subject to the balance sheet constraint L+Nr +Nm = D +E. Note that the bank’s
survival probability is given by q = Prob(Π˜ + E ≥ 0). Following [MV96], we abstract
from the assumption of limited liability.
We normalize the bank’s objective function by bank asset A and take expectations.
The normalized objective function is then given by
max
nm,nr
µpi + e (3.4)
subject to l+nr +nm = 1, where µpi ≡ E(Π˜)E = (1−x)rLl+ rmnm+ rrnαr l1−α− cmnm−
crnr − cf − rD(1− e), e = E/A, l = L/A, nM = NM/A and nr = Nr/A.
Note that nm and nr capture market-based and retail-based NII intensity (share of
NII activities in bank asset, different from income), l is the LTA ratio, and µpi captures
the expected return on asset (ROA).
11The specific functional forms for the returns on retail-oriented NII (Nr) and market-oriented NII
(Nm) are not critical for the theoretical results. Instead of the linear specification of the return on Nm,
one can also assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, NβmL
1−β , where β > α for the market-based
NII activities. The underlying reason for β > α is that retail-oriented NII is expected to have more
complementarity with bank lending than with market-oriented NII activities. In other words, there
could be complementarities between market-based NII activities and bank lending, but the degree of
complementarity between retail-based NII activities and bank lending is expected to be higher than that
of market-based ones.
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Definition of Risks
As we are interested in the relationships between bank profitability and financial stability,
we focus on two types of risks that are particularly relevant for financial stability con-
siderations. First, we consider the default probability of a bank, measured by its overall
credit risk or solvency. Second, we are interested in the tail risks faced by a bank. Based
on our stylized theoretical model, we define the EDF proxy (default probability) and the
VaR of individual banks as follows:
Expected Default Frequency Proxy (EDF)
EDF ≡ 1− q = Prob(p˜i + e < 0). (3.5)
The EDF proxy is defined as one minus the survival probability of the bank12. A
bank defaults in our model when equity is below zero.
Value-at-Risk (VaR)
Prob(|loss| ≥ V aR) = Prob(−p˜i − e ≥ V aR) = 0.05. (3.6)
The VaR is defined as the 95 percentile of equity loss in this model, where higher VaR
signifies higher tail risks.
3.2.2 Solutions and Propositions
We solve the bank’s optimization problem by taking first order conditions with respect
to nm and nr, subject to its budget constraint. The resulting first order conditions are
given as follows:
[nm] : rm = cm + ϕ if nm > 0
[nr] : αrrn
α−1
r l
1−α = cr + ϕ if nm > 0
(3.7)
where ϕ is the Lagrange multiplier of l + nr + nm = 1.
12This definition of the EDF proxy is applicable to a more general concept of default probability.
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Figure 3.1: Optimal Market-based and Retail-based NII Intensity
We then rewrite the first order conditions with superscript ∗ denoting the optimal
value of choice variables:
if l ≥ 1
1 + k
: n∗r = 1− l, n∗m = 0 and n∗r/n∗m =∞
if l <
1
1 + k
: n∗r = kl, n
∗
m = 1− l − kl and n∗r/n∗m =
kl
1− l − kl
(3.8)
where k =
(
αrr
cr+rm−cm
) 1
1−α
> 0.
If l < 1/(1+k), the first order conditions imply an interior solution where the optimal
retail-based NII intensity n∗r is a positive function of the LTA ratio l, reflecting the
complementarity between nr and l. If l1/(1+k), the first order conditions imply a corner
solution where the optimal market-based NII intensity n∗m is equal to zero (Figure 3.1,
left panel).
Risks and Profitability
Based on the model solutions, we can derive Proposition 1 on the relationship between
bank risks and profitability.
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Proposition 3. Bank idiosyncratic risks measured by EDF and VaR are decreasing in
the (expected) ROA µ∗pi.
∂EDF
∂µ∗pi
< 0,
∂V aR
∂µ∗pi
< 0
Proof. See Appendix 5.2. 
The intuition for the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risks and bank prof-
itability is that per-period profit µ∗pi (or the book value of profit) provides a buffer against
negative shocks to bank capital. Higher µ∗pi means larger buffers and reduced default risk,
which lowers idiosyncratic risks13.
Risks, NII, and the LTA Ratio
Having established the analytical relationship between bank profitability and risks, we
next examine the source of bank profitability and the relationship to bank risks. We are
particularly interested in the role of NII activities for risks, accounting for bank business
models. From the first order conditions of the model, we derive the Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 4. The ratio of retail-based NII intensity to market-based NII intensity is in-
creasing in the LTA ratio:
∂(n∗r/n
∗
m)
∂l
≥ 0.
Proof. From the solution to first order conditions, we have
if l ≥ 1
1 + k
:
∂(n∗r/n
∗
m)
∂l
= 0
if l <
1
1 + k
:
∂(n∗r/n
∗
m)
∂l
=
k
(1− l − kl)2 > 0.

13Some papers that internalize borrowers’ decisions argue that if lower profitability is a result of lower
interest rate margins, then reduced credit rationing in the loan market will improve the average quality
of loan applicants, which ultimately translates to lower bank risks ([BD05, SW81]). Given that interest
rates were very low in our sample period of 2004 to 2017, it is reasonable to abstract from the credit
rationing channel. Instead, we focus on the equity buffer channel and the charter value channel of bank
profitability in our stylized theoretical model.
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Lemma 4 states that the composition of NII will change with respect to the LTA
ratio. The result is also shown in the right panel in the Figure 3.114. Intuitively, this
result follows from the complementarity between nr and l, because of the term n
α
r l
1−α in
expected profitability µpi. The LTA ratio l is a proxy of the retail business for a bank.
Higher l is associated with more retail clients, which makes developing retail-based NII
activities easier (the marginal benefit of nr depicted by αrrn
α−1
r l
1−α increases in l). So a
high-l bank willingly leans toward more retail-based NII, and n∗r/n
∗
m increases.
Denote the (expected) share of the (overall) NII as
s =
NII
NII + II
=
rmn
∗
m + rrn
∗α
r l
1−α
rmn∗m + rrn∗αr l1−α + (1− x)rLl
. (3.9)
Under the interior solution, when l < 1/(1 + k), the share of NII s can be rewritten
as
s =
rm − cm − (1 + k)l(rm − cm) + (rkα − crk)l
rm − cm − (1 + k)l(rm − cm) + (rkα − crk)l + (1− x)rLl
and it is straight forward to show that
∂s
∂n
=
∂s
∂(nr + nm)
=
∂s
∂(1− l) = −
∂s
∂l
> 0.
In other words, the expected NII share is increasing in total NII intensity nr + nm.
This leads to the following proposition regarding NII activities and bank risks.
Proposition 4. When LTA ratio (l) is below a certain threshold (l), higher NII share
(s) will lead to higher VaR and EDF:
∂EDF
∂s
> 0 and
∂V aR
∂s
> 0 if l < l =
(1 + k)σ2m
(1− x)2σ2L + (1 + k)2σ2m + k2ασ2r
<
1
1 + k
under a regularity condition15.
Proof. See Appendix 5.2. 
14In Figure 3.1, at the red dotted line l = 1/(1 + k), the bank’s optimization problem yields a corner
solution as n∗m = 0.
15The regularity condition is that the problem loan ratio x < 1 +
(rm−cm)( 1−αα k−1)+ 1−αα kcr
rL
. This
parameter assumption is reasonable, as the average value of x observed empirically in our sample is less
than 5%.
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Figure 3.2: Non-interest Income Share and Risks
The effect of the NII share on idiosyncratic risks (VaR and EDF) are illustrated in
Figure 3.2. The dotted blue line denotes l. When l ≤ l, the partial derivatives are
positive, meaning that increasing NII share will result in higher idiosyncratic risks. This
is because, as noted in Lemma 4, n∗r/n
∗
m decreases as l declines.
To understand the underlying mechanism, note that bank assets are a portfolio with
three sources of return: loans (rL), market-based NII activities (rm), and retail-based NII
activities (rr). The overall bank idiosyncratic risk is a function of the portfolio weights
l, nr, and nm. As long as not all “assets” are perfectly correlated, there is benefit from
diversification (i.e., it is risk-reducing to participate in NII activities nm, nr > 0). An
over-reliance on any particular type of assets is sub-optimal.
The interesting result is that the profit-maximizing weights (n∗m, n
∗
r) chosen by banks
are not necessarily risk-minimizing, even if in this model, higher expected profits do
help reduce risks (i.e., Proposition 3). Crucially dependent on a bank’s business model
(differentiated via loan-to-asset ratio l), it is preferable to increase or decrease the share
of NII activities n∗m + n
∗
r (or equivalently change l) from a financial stability/risk-control
perspective. When l is too low (l ≤ l), further action to weigh in NII activities (reduce
l) will increase risks (∂EDF
∂s
> 0, ∂V aR
∂s
> 0). A bank too reliant on loan income ( l > l)
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should do the reverse and increase NII (i.e., to the right of the dotted line in Figure 3.2)
to capture their diversification benefits.
Riskiness of Market-Based NII Activities nm
So far I have abstracted from the discussion of σ2m and σ
2
r (variance of the returns from
market-based and retailed-based NII activities). What if σ2m > σ
2
r , σ
2
L, as is empirically
true ([Sti02])?
From l = (1+k)σ
2
m
(1−x)2σ2L+(1+k)2σ2m+k2ασ2r
, we can see l is increasing in σ2m. As market-based
NII become more volatile, more banks will fall into the range where l < l and they be-
come over-reliant on riskier market-based NII activities (nm is too high, or equivalently
nr/nm too low). For such banks, it would be advisable to reduce the exposure to NII
activities and increase interest income share since ∂EDF
∂s
> 0, ∂V aR
∂s
> 0. Only for banks
with high loan-to-asset ratio (l > l) is there risk-reducing benefit from increasing NII ac-
tivities, because they will incline toward safer retail-based NII activities nr (endogenously
determined by the complementarity between nr and l).
In the most extreme case when σ2m → ∞, we have l → 11+k . So only banks with
loan-to-asset ratio higher than 1
1+k
should venture into NII activities from the financial
stability standpoint, because only those banks have n∗m = 0 (see Equation 3.8).
Retail-Based NII Activities nr and Loan Income
What is the relationship between retail-based NII activities nr and loan l? As a result
of the common consumer based (which also gives rise to the complementarity) between
nr and l, it is reasonable to allow for some positive correlation between r˜r and r˜L. For
example, if r˜r and r˜L follow a bivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficient ρ,
l becomes
l =
(1 + k)σ2m
(1− x)2σ2L + (1 + k)2σ2m + k2ασ2r + α(1− x)kαρσLσr
All the aforementioned results will still hold in this more general case.
Our theoretical finding is consistent with that of [MRV16] and [MNP18], which suggest
that NII activities could lead to higher risks. The former propose that higher profitability
in core business relaxes a bank’s leverage constraint, enabling more risk-taking in non-
core (i.e., NII) business. The latter also argue that NII is the main culprit of highly
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volatile returns (high profit in good times and high loss in bad times). Given that NII
is a broad catogory, with distint risks for different NII components ([Sti02]), our model
endogenizes a bank’s decision on which NII activities to focus on, which in turn draws
different predictions on the effect of NII activities on bank risks.
Discussion of Systemic Risks
Besides idiosyncratic risks, the activities of a financial institution can contribute to sys-
temic risk (i.e., to the overall financial system). In this model, market-based NII activities
nm can have implications on a bank’s systemic risks, even if we do not model the finan-
cial system (and its risk) explicitly. First, participation in market-making activities and
securitization (among other examples of nm) will increase the risks a bank imposes on
the financial system (e.g., Lehman Brothers). Second, as returns of nm, r˜m, can be highly
correlated to the market and across banks, nm can increase the correlation and contagion
risks, contributing to higher systemic risks [BCH17]. In other words, a higher value of
nm is then expected to contribute to higher systemic risks.
Because this is a model focused on bank idiosyncratic risks, we cannot directly map
our theoretical results to systemic risk analysis. Still, it is interesting to see empirically
whether the level and source of profits will have similar effects on bank systemic risks,
which we will come back to in Section 3.4.
3.2.3 Extensions with Bank Charter Value
In addition to the book value of profitability (or per period profit), another common mea-
sure of profitability is the price-to-book ratio, which can be interpreted as the charter
value of a bank, or expected discounted future profits. A high charter value can have a
disciplinary effect on bank risk-taking behavior. Motivated by this consideration, we ex-
tend our baseline model to include the interaction of bank charter value and idiosyncratic
risks. For analytical simplicity, we consider a case where a bank has already made the
optimal choice on NII activities (i.e., nm = n
∗
m and nr = n
∗
r) and isolate the implication
of charter value on banking risks alone.
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In the extended model, the bank is also subject to a random shock −zA to equity16,
where z follows a Bernoulli Distribution:
z =

 with probability 1− p
0 with probability p.
One interpretation of shock z is an operational risk shock. The likelihood that the
bank is affected by the random shock z depends on the intensity of its monitoring. The
more intense the monitoring activity (high monitoring cost), the lower the likelihood that
it will be affected by shocks to equity. The monitoring or risk management cost is given
by:
C(p) = −1
2
bp2A
where C(p) is a function of asset size A, the probability of the shock p, and a constant
b. A banks is therefore incentivized to monitor—in order to reduce the expected equity
impact from random shock—as long as the marginal monitoring cost does not exceed the
marginal impact on bank equity from the random shock.
Also, let V denote the continuation value of bank equity. Other interpretations of
V can be the charter value, discounted future profits, or the market value of equity (see
[FR08], Chapter 3.5). For tractability, we assume that V is exogenously given17.
16Therefore, there are two sources of randomness in the extended model. The first one is the random-
ness to asset returns r˜L, r˜m and r˜r, which follow a normal distribution as explained earlier. At optimal
levels of nm and nr, the expected returns are fixed while the actual returns remain random. The second
source of randomness is a shock z to bank equity. In the extension, a bank’s only choice variable is the
probability of the equity shock z.
17In this stylized model, we do not endogenize the continuation value of equity V , as it is not crucial
for the derivation of the analytical relationships between bank profitability and financial stability. One
could potentially extend the model to a dynamic setting where V will depend on the entry cost of banks.
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New Objective Function
The bank’s new objective function18 is then given by:
max
p
E(Π˜ + E − zA)− 1
2
bp2A+ qV (3.10)
subject to the balance sheet constraint L + Nr + Nm = D + E. We then normalize
the bank’s objective function by bank asset A and take expectations. The normalized
objective function is then given by
max
p
µ∗pi + e− (1− p)−
1
2
bp2 + qev (3.11)
where v = V
E
= Price-to-Book Ratio and e = E/A captures the inverse of leverage.
Since the bank is subject to a new equity shock, the bank’s survival profitability is
modified to q′, reflecting the Bernoulli Distribution of shock z:
q′ =Prob(p˜i + e− z ≥ 0)
=p · Prob(p˜i + e− z ≥ 0) + (1− p) · p˜i + e− z ≥ )
=p
[
Φ(
µpi + e
σpi
)− Φ(µpi + e− 
σpi
)
]
+ Φ(
µpi + e− 
σpi
).
Bank idiosyncratic risk measures can also be modified to account for the new equity
shock:
EDF ′ =≡ 1− q′ = Prob(p˜i + e− z ≥ 0)
Prob(|Loss| ≥ V aR) = Prob(−p˜i − e+ z ≥ V aR′) = 0.05.
The optimal shock probability p∗ is then given by the first order condition with respect
to p:
p∗ =
+
[
Φ(µ
∗
pi+e
σ∗pi
)− Φ(µ∗pi+e−
σ∗pi
)
]
ev
b
. (3.12)
18With limited liability, there is a threshold Vˆ (charter value) below which banks engages in risk-
taking behavior, as the low charter value is not sufficient to discipline them ([FR08], Chapter 3.5).
This mechanism is not our focus, as the empirical evidence is largely in favor of the mechanism that
charter value defers risk taking (see, for example, [Kee90] [BKT09]), which is captured in our modeling
framework.
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It is interesting to note that p∗ is positively related to the price-to-book ratio v, and
the inverse of leverage e. Recall that p∗ is the probability that the equity impact of
shock z is zero (or minimum), and a higher p∗ is associated with more intense monitoring
or higher monitoring costs. One interpretation is that rising price-to-book values or
falling leverage (higher equity) incentivizes banks to monitor and to reduce the equity
impact of shocks. Based on these consideration, we derive two propositions that underpin
the analytical relationships between idiosyncratic risks and the price-to-book ratio, and
between idiosyncratic risks and bank leverage.
Risks and the Price-to-Book Ratio
Proposition 5. Bank idiosyncratic risks measured by EDF’ and VaR’ are decreasing in
the price-to-book ratio v.
∂EDF ′
∂v
< 0 ,
∂V aR′
∂v
< 0
Proof. See Appendix 5.2 
The intuition for the negative relationship between bank idiosyncratic risks and the
price-to-book value, v, is that higher charter value or long-term profits (captured by v)
deters risk-taking behavior of banks. A bank is only able to retain its charter value if it
survives at the end of the period. Therefore, the higher the v, the higher the incentive
for banks to reduce risk-taking and avoid potential bankruptcy. This finding is consistent
with that of [Kee90] and subsequent papers (e.g., [BT10, MV00, Rep04]) that charter
value provides incentive for prudence19.
19Some papers that internalize borrowers’ decisions argue that if lower profitability results from lower
interest rate margins, reducing credit rationing in the loan market will improve the average quality of
loan applicants, which ultimately translates to lower bank risks ([BN05, SW81]). Given that interest
rates were very low in our 2004-2017 sample period, it is reasonable to abstract from the credit rationing
channel. Instead, we focus on the equity buffer channel and the charter value channel of bank profitability
in our stylized theoretical model.
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Risks and Leverage
We can also derive that a higher equity to asset ratio, or lower leverage, will reduce bank
idiosyncratic risks.
Proposition 6. Bank idiosyncratic risks measured by EDF’ and VaR’ are decreasing in
e (increasing in leverage 1/e).
∂EDF ′
∂e
< 0 ,
∂V aR′
∂e
< 0
Proof. See Appendix 5.2 
Higher equity-to-asset ratio e implies more “skin in the game for banks, and thus
they will have higher incentives to monitor and reduce risk-taking behaviors to avoid
defaults. As discussed earlier, this is reflected by the fact that p, the probability of no
equity shock (a choice variable to the bank), is negatively related to e, as in equation
3.12. Additionally, higher equity increases the buffer against negative shocks for banks,
which reduce bank risks mechanically through accounting relationships in bank balance
sheets20.
3.3 Stylized Facts and Empirical Methodology
3.3.1 Key Variables
We consider a sample of 431 publicly-traded banks in our empirical analysis. The sample
includes all public banks in the U.S. and developed Europe, and all other Global System-
ically Important Banks (GSIBs)21. The sample period spans from 2004 to 2017 and the
20It should be noted that the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and leverage also holds in the
simple baseline model. The intuition is that higher equity leads to higher buffers against negative shocks.
In the extended model, the channels through which leverage affects idiosyncratic risks are richer, as they
not only pertain to equity buffers, but also to the charter value of banks and bank incentives to monitor.
For completion, we also provide a proof on the negative relationship between idiosyncratic risk and
leverage in the simple baseline model (Corollary 6.1) in the Appendix 5.2.
21Among the publicly traded banks, 308 are from the U.S. and 115 are from developed Europe. In
addition, the sample includes the eight GSIBs from outside the U.S. and the Europe. The average
asset size for U.S. banks, European banks, and GSIBs are $53 billion, $274 billion, and $1710 billion,
respectively. The GSIB list follows the classification by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in 2017.
http://www.fsb.org/2017/11/2017-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-g-sibs/
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data source is S&P Global Market Intelligence’s SNL database22.
Profitability Measures
Five profitability measures are considered in the empirical analysis: ROAA, ROAE, risk-
adjusted ROAA, risk-adjusted ROAE, and the price-to-book ratio23. The risk-adjusted
profitability measures are computed as the ratio of headline profitability measures (ROAA
or ROAE) and their standard deviation for the sample period (2004 to 2017) for each
bank. The price-to-book ratio is the ratio of the market value of equity (share price) and
the book value of equity, which is often used as a proxy for expected profitability (or
charter value).
Financial Stability Measures
Financial stability is captured by three systemic and idiosyncratic risk measures. Sys-
temic risk is measured by the delta ∆CoV aR ([AB16]), while idiosyncratic risk is mea-
sured by the five percent VaR and Moody’s EDF24.
Idiosyncratic Risk Measures
Idiosyncratic risk is measured by two market-based risk measures: historical VaR
based on annualized daily equity return at 5 percent and Moody’s EDF.
The five percent VaR is computed as the lowest five percent quantile of daily equity
returns in a particular year. Moody’s EDF is a forward-looking measure of actual prob-
ability of default of a bank over a specified period of time (one year in this application).
According to the Moody’s EDF model, a bank defaults when the market value of its
assets falls below its liabilities25.
22For sources and definitions of the variables, see Appendix 5.3.
23The choice of the profitability measures is motived by our theoretical model. ROAA and ROAE are
empirical proxies for per-period profit (µpi), and the price to book ratio is an empirical proxy for chart
value or discounted future profits (V ). In addition, we are interested in analyzing risk-adjusted ROAA
and ROAE measures.
24Similarly, the choice of idiosyncratic risk measures is motivated by the theoretical model. The
empirical VaR and EDF map directly to the risk measures (VaR and EDF) in the theoretical framework.
We also consider an established systemic risk measure ∆CoV aR ([AB16]).
25See Moody’s Analytics at https://www.moodysanalytics.com for details on constructing EDFs.
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Systemic Risk Measure
Following [AB16], the ∆CoV aR is estimated using quantile regression on weekly
data26:
X it = α
i
q + γ
i
qMt−1 + 
i
q,t
X
System|i
t = α
System|i
q + γ
System|i
q Mt−1 + β
System|i
q X
i
t + 
System|i
q,t
where X it denotes the weekly equity return of bank i, X
System|i
t the weekly system
equity return conditional on bank i, and Mt the list of state variables. We use q to
denote the qth quantile. We then use the predicted values from these regressions to
obtain VaR and CoVaR conditional on state variables:
V aRiq,t = α
i
q + γ
i
qMt−1
CoV aRiq,t = α
System|i
q + γ
System|i
q Mt−1 + β
System|i
q V aR
i
q,t.
Finally, we compute ∆CoV aRiq,t for each bank as the difference between the qth
percentile CoVaR and the median CoVaR:
∆CoV aRiq,t = CoV aR
i
q,t − CoV aRi50,t = βSystem|iq (V aRiq,t − V aRi50,t)
In this paper, we consider the 5th percentile ∆CoV aR in the empirical analysis. For
European banks, Euro Stoxx bank returns were used to capture financial sector returns,
while S&P 500 financial index returns were used for U.S. banks and other GSIBs.
We consider a set of state variables in the quantile regression estimations, including
interest rates, term structure of interest rates, liquidity risk, credit risk, market returns,
market volatility, and excess return of the financial sector over the real estate sector. For
the most part, U.S.-specific state variables were used to construct the ∆CoV aR for U.S.
26For ease of illustration, we follow the same notation as in [AB16].
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banks and other GSIBs27, while Europe-specific state variables were applied to European
banks. The exception was credit risk and VIX measures, which were used in both cases.
The following set of state variables were used in the estimation: (i) interest rates,
measured by the change in 3-month German bond yields, and the change in 3-month
T-bill rates; (ii) term structure of interest rates, measured by the change in the spread
between 10-year and 3-month German government bond yields, and the change in the
spread between 10-year and 3-month T-bill rates; (iii) liquidity risk, measured by the
change in the difference between 3-month Euribor (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) and 3-
month Germany bond yields, and the change in the difference between 3-month LIBOR
and 3-month secondary market T-bill rates; (iv) credit risk, measured by the change in
credit spreads between Moody’s Baa-rated bonds and the 10-year Treasury rates; (v)
market returns from the Euro Stoxx 50 and S&P 500 indices; (vi) market volatility,
measured by the change in the VIX index; and (viii) excess return of the financial sector
over the real estate sector, measured by the difference between the Euro Stoxx banks
index returns and the MSCI Europe real estate index returns, and the difference between
the S&P 500 financials index returns and the Dow Jones U.S. real estate index28.
Bank Business Models and Characteristics
Bank business models are captured by four variables in the analysis. First, to measure
the reliance of banks on NII we consider the share of NII to revenue. Second, the LTA
ratio is used as a proxy for retail vs. wholesale business models for banks. Third, the
deposit-to-liability ratio is used to capture banks’ reliance on wholesale funding. Fourth,
the asset-to-equity ratio is used to measure the extent of leverage. These four business
model variables capture both returns and asset allocation of banks, and both the asset
and the liabilities sides of bank balance sheets. The four variables are examined in detail
27Similar to [LMR12], we use the set of state variables sampled from the U.S. market as common
conditional variables for other GSIBs.
28As a robustness check, we also consider a version of the ∆CoV aR estimation that controls for state
variables based on world variables, in addition to regional ones. In this case, the financial sector return
was measured by the return of the MSCI world financial index, the market return was captured by the
MSCI world index return, and the excess return was measured by the difference between the MSCI world
financial index returns and the MSCI world real estate index returns. The results are found to be very
similar. For the rest of the paper, we focus on the ∆CoV aR analysis based on region-specific state
variables.
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in the analysis on the determinants of risks.
Several variables on bank characteristics are controlled for in the empirical analysis,
including solvency, measured by the Tier 1 capital ratio; asset quality, captured by the
problem loans ratio; and efficiency, captured by cost-to-income and cost of funds ratios.
The cost-to-income ratio is measured by the ratio of operating expense to operating
income and is a standard measure of operating efficiency ([BGH17, Int17]). The cost
of funds ratio is captured by the interest incurred on liabilities as a percent of average
noninterest-bearing deposits and interest-bearing liabilities.
In addition, the Lerner index was constructed to capture the market power or mark-
up of banks. Following the specification in [BKT09], the Lerner Index for bank i was
constructed as Lit = (Pit −MCit)/Pit , where Pit is the price of assets, measured by the
ratio of total revenue to total assets, and MCit is the marginal cost of total assets. The
higher the value of the Lerner index, the easier it is for a bank to charge over its marginal
costs, and therefore the greater its mark-up or market power.
The marginal cost of total assets for bank i at time t, MCit, is computed as MCit =
costit
Qit
[β1 + β2 lnQit +
∑3
k=1 φk lnWk,it], where W1,it is the ratio of personnel expense to
total assets and a proxy for the input price of labor, W2,it is the ratio of interest expense
to total deposits and a proxy for the input price of funds, and W3,it is the ratio of other
operating and administrative expenses to total assets and captures the input price of fixed
capital29. Qit and costit capture total assets and total costs, respectively. Furthermore,
the coefficients β1, β2, and φk are estimated from the following cost equation:
ln costit =β0 + β1 lnQit +
β2
2
lnQ2it
+
3∑
k=1
γkt lnWk,it +
3∑
k=1
φk lnQit lnWk,it
+
3∑
k=1
3∑
j=1
lnWk,it lnWj,it + it.
As noted in the literature, the Lerner index has several advantages over alternative
measures of market competition and concentration. First, the Lerner index can be com-
29Note that W2,it reflects market power in the deposit market. Alternatively, the Lerner index could
be computed using the marginal cost estimation for bank loans, which requires a measure of the risk
premium based on confidential supervisory data ([JLS13]).
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puted at the bank level, without relying on precise definitions of the geographic product
markets [ADZ14]. For the international-oriented banks in our sample, it is particularly
difficult to define geographic markets as they often operate in number of jurisdictions and
product markets. Second, the Lerner index measures a bank’s pricing power or mark-up
and better captures the theoretical concept of bank franchise value ([BDS13]). In addi-
tion, the Lerner index utilizes information on both the asset and liability sides of bank
balance sheets, as it captures both profits (generated with bank assets) and costs of bank
operations ([ADZ14]).
Policy Measures and Cyclical Variables
For the empirical analysis, we control for both monetary and fiscal policy measures.
Monetary policy is measured by 3-month short-term interest rates (OECD) and central
banks’ claims on financial institutions (IMF IFS). Fiscal policy is measured by the ratio of
government structural balances to potential GDP, to proxy the fiscal stance (IMF WEO).
We use GDP growth as a proxy for cyclical conditions in the economy.
3.3.2 Stylized Facts
Bank profitability, measured by ROAA, ROAE, and price-to-book ratio, all declined
sharply during the 2007-2009 GFC (Figure 3.3). In general, U.S. banks have recovered
faster than European banks post-crisis partly because European banks experienced an-
other sharp decline in book profitability and price-to-book ratios during the 2012-2014
European Sovereign Debt Crisis. Interestingly, while U.S. banks’ book return (ROAA
and ROAE) were not affected by the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, their price-to-
book ratio experienced a sizable drop. This suggests that while the actual impact of the
European crisis on book profitability was regional, it influenced investor’s perception of
banks’ capacity to generate future profits globally. It should be noted that none of the
profitability measures have returned to pre-crisis levels30.
For systemic and idiosyncratic risk measures, we also observe a clear impact from
the GFC and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, where risks became elevated (Figure
30Risk-adjusted ROAA and ROAE display similar dynamics.
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Figure 3.3: Bank Profitability and Price-to-Book Ratio
Notes: See Appendix 5.3 for sources and definitions of the variables. The figures are weighted using asset
share for each group of banks. The green, blue, and red lines denote European banks, U.S. banks, and
Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs), respectively. Sources: S&P Global Market Intelligence’s
SNL database and IMF staff calculations.
Figure 3.4: Systemic and Idiosyncratic Risks
Notes: The figures are weighted using asset share for each group of banks. The green, blue, and red lines
denote European banks, U.S. banks, and Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs), respectively.
Sources: Bloomberg, Moody’s Analytics, and IMF staff calculations.
3.4). For systemic risk measured by the ∆CoV aR, U.S. banks tend to have a higher
contribution to systemic risk, compared with European banks31. For idiosyncratic risks
measured by the VaR and the EDF, they appeared elevated for U.S. banks during the
2007-2009 GFC, but were overtaken by European banks during the 2012-2014 European
Sovereign Debt Crisis.
On bank characteristics, U.S. banks tend to have higher LTA and deposit-to-liability
ratios during the 2004-2017 sample period (Figure 3.5). As expected, GSIBs have the
lowest LTA ratios, as a high proportion of their balance sheets are devoted to investment
31It should be noted that both ∆CoV aR measures (with regional and global state variables) show
that U.S. banks tend to have a higher contribution to systemic risks, in part because equity returns in
the U.S. are more correlated with global equity returns.
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Figure 3.5: Bank Business Models and Characteristics
Notes: See Appendix 5.3 for sources and definitions of the variables. The figures are weighted using
asset share for each group of banks. The green, blue, and red lines denote European banks, U.S. banks,
and Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs), respectively. The leverage ratio is constructed as
the ratio of asset to equity. Sources: S&P Global Market Intelligence’s SNL database and IMF staff
calculations.
banking and other non-traditional banking business32. In general, LTA ratios have in-
creased for banks since the crisis. While the NII share has declined since the crisis, it
has stabilized more recently. European banks appear to have higher leverage and higher
problem loan ratios compared with U.S. banks and GSIBs, despite a decline since the
peak of the crisis. The Tier 1 ratio has risen markedly for banks since the crisis, in part
due to tighter regulations. More recently, cost efficiency, measured by the cost-to-income
ratio, has improved for GSIBs and U.S. banks. Similarly, funding costs have declined for
banks, with U.S. banks enjoying the lowest cost of funds on average. Finally, the Lerner
index suggests that U.S. banks have higher pricing power compared with European banks
and GSIBs.
32Average LTA ratios for European, U.S., and Asian GSIBs are 43%, 32%, and 48%, respectively, in
2017. Similarly, average NII ratios for European, U.S., and Asian GSIBs are 48%, 58% and 39%, respec-
tively, suggesting that U.S. GSIBs are more involved in investment banking and other non-traditional
banking business.
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3.3.3 Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology
Based on our stylized theoretical model, we derive four testable hypotheses to be exam-
ined empirically. The relationship between idiosyncratic risks and bank profitability and
that between profitability and its determinants are directly based on the five propositions
from the theoretical model. Furthermore, we are interested in understanding if the pre-
dicted relationship between bank profitability and idiosyncratic risks could be extended
to systemic risks empirically.
Hypothesis 1. Low profitability is associated with high idiosyncratic risks (Proposition
3 & 5) and high contribution to systemic risks.
Hypothesis 2. High NII share is associated with high idiosyncratic risks (Proposition 4)
and high contribution to systemic risks for less retail-oriented banks33.
Hypothesis 3. High leverage is associated with high idiosyncratic risks (Proposition 6)
and high contribution to systemic risks.
The hypotheses relate to bank business models and the impact of the source of bank
profitability on risks. In addition, we are also interested in examining the effect of the
Lerner index (market power) and the reliance on wholesale funding on idiosyncratic and
systemic risks.
The main empirical approach to examine the three hypotheses on bank profitability,
financial stability, and business models was a panel regression setup that controls for
business models, bank characteristics, as well as policy variables and cyclical conditions
in the economy. It was estimated with the Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond linear dynamic
panel-data estimator with robust standard errors34, specified as follows:
Ykjt = δYkj,t−1 + ϑk + φ′Xkjt + Γ′Mjt + εkjt (3.13)
33See the discussion of systemic risks in Section 3.2
34A dynamic panel regression is specified due to the persistence in systemic and idiosyncratic risks.
The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator is an extension of the Arellano-Bond estimator that
accommodates large autoregressive parameters and a large ratio of the variance of the panel-level effect to
the variance of idiosyncratic error. The Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system estimator is designed for
datasets with many panels and few periods, which is the case for our dataset. An alternative fixed-effect
static panel was specified as a robustness check and the results were found to be broadly similar.
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where Ykjt captures either risks or profitability for bank k, headquartered in country
j at time t. To take into account bank-specific conditions, we include a set of bank-fixed
effects (ϑk) and a vector of (time-varying) bank-specific indicators Xkjt.
In the panel regression estimations, we examine the determinants of financial stability
or risks, measured by the VaR, the EDF, and the ∆CoV aR (Ykjt). Key bank-specific
variables (Xkjt) include bank profitability, the share of NII, and the interaction term
between NII and the LTA ratio. We also consider the bank-specific problem loan ratio,
leverage, and the Lerner index. In addition, we control for policy and cyclical variables
(Mjt), capturing monetary policy (short-term interest rates), fiscal policy (government
structural balance), and GDP growth35.
3.4 Empirical Findings
This section quantifies the impact of profitability on financial stability using bank-level
data for publicly traded U.S., European banks, and Global Systemically Important Banks
(GSIBs). As mentioned earlier, financial stability is measured by both idiosyncratic and
systemic risks. Idiosyncratic risk is captured by the VaR (5 percent) and Moody’s EDF,
and systemic risk is captured by the ∆CoV aR.
3.4.1 Idiosyncratic risk
As predicted by our stylized theoretical model in Section II, empirical results over the
2004-2017 sample period reveal that profitability (ROAA) and the price-to-book ratio
(charter value) are negatively associated with banks’ idiosyncratic risk, measured by
VaR (Table 3.1), confirming hypothesis 1. As banks’ book profitability or charter value
improves, they have more “skin in the game” and they are less willing to engage in
risk-taking behavior. This finding suggests that, on average, the charter value channel
dominates as higher profits and consequently higher capital is associated with less risk-
taking by banks. The effect of profitability on VaR is also economically significant. A one
35We do not divide our sample into pre-crisis (2004-2007) and post-crisis (2008-2017) sub-periods due
to data limitation. The dynamic panel regression requires the third or deeper lags as instruments, which
leaves us with only 2007’s observations at best for a pre-crisis analysis.
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standard deviation increase in ROAA, for instance, is associated with a 0.64 percentage
point decrease in VaR, or about a quarter of the median VaR (2.57 percent). Similarly, a
one standard deviation rise in the price-to-book ratio is associated with a 0.59 percentage
point decline in VaR, which is also sizable.
In general, a higher NII share is significantly associated with higher VaR. However, the
interaction term between the share of NII and the LTA ratio suggests that a higher NII
share in retail-oriented banks tends to be associated with a decline in VaR. This empirical
finding is consistent with our theoretical prediction that the negative impact from non-
interest income is dependent on the value of the LTA ratio, confirming hypothesis 2. One
explanation based on our theoretical model is that retail-oriented banks tend to engage
in more traditional or fee-based NII activities due to their existing retail client base,
instead of more-risky market-based NII activities. Therefore, the marginal effect of NII
on bank risks is dependent on the retail orientation of banks, and there could be some
diversification benefits for retail-oriented banks to move toward traditional NII activities.
Our empirical findings, based on a cross-country sample, are consistent with the earlier
work on the German banking sector by [Koh14], which suggested that diversification
into NII activities were more beneficial for retail-oriented banks such as savings and
cooperative banks.
Higher market power, as measured by the Lerner index, is associated with lower VaR.
One potential explanation is that profitable banks have higher charter value and are
therefore less willing to engage in risk-taking behavior (e.g., [Kee90, BKT09]). Higher
leverage or lower equity-to-asset ratios are associated with higher VaR, confirming hy-
pothesis 3. Furthermore, a high reliance on wholesale funding (low deposit-to-liability
ratios) and elevated problem loan ratios tend to be associated with higher idiosyncratic
risk as measured by VaR. Finally, a favorable macroeconomic environment, as measured
by high GDP growth, is often associated with lower VaR36.
The empirical findings based on the other measure of bank-specific idiosyncratic risk,
36On monetary policy, the empirical result suggests that monetary easing measured by lower short-term
interest rate in our sample period from 2004 to 2017 is associated with lower bank-specific idiosyncratic
risks, which suggests that the post-crisis monetary policy response by central banks were effective.
However, this finding does not bear conclusion on future paths of monetary policy or how central banks
should set monetary policy going forward.
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the EDF, is similar. As predicted by the theoretical model, both the ROAA and the
price-to-book ratios are negatively associated with the one-year ahead EDF (Table 3.2),
confirming hypothesis 1.
While a high NII ratio is generally associated with a high default probability, there
appears to be diversification benefits for retail-oriented banks, confirming hypothesis 2.
As mentioned earlier, one explanation offered by our theoretical model is that retail-
oriented banks tend to engage in fee-based NII activities (less risky) due to their existing
retail client base, instead of market-based NII activities such as investment banking
and securitization (riskier). Our empirical finding on the relationship between default
probability and diversification is consistent with earlier work on the U.S. banking sector
by [DT13].
Similarly, as was the case for VaR, a higher problem loan ratio is associated with
higher default probability for banks. There is some evidence that a higher leverage ratio
is significantly associated with higher EDF, confirming hypothesis 3. Finally, a favorable
macroeconomic environment is associated with declining bank default probabilities.
3.4.2 Systemic Risks
In addition to bank idiosyncratic risks, we also consider the relationship between bank
profitability and systemic risks. Empirical results reveal that profitability (ROAA) and
the price-to-book ratios (charter value) are negatively associated with banks’ contribution
to systemic risk (∆CoV aR; see Table 3.3). As firm’s current book profitability or charter
value improves, their contribution to systemic risk tend to decline (hypothesis 1). One
intuitive explanation for this finding is that, as banks’ charter value increases, they engage
in less risk-taking at the individual bank level, and thereby reducing their systemic risk
contribution. While some analysis that examined crisis episodes suggests that high profits
in good times could be an indicator of systemic tail risk in bad times ([MNP18]), our
results suggest that on average the charter value channel dominates as higher profits and
consequently higher capital is associated with less risk-taking by banks when we consider
a full sample that embeds both crisis and normal times from 2004 to 2017.
Like the findings for idiosyncratic risks, a higher share of NII is generally associated
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Table 3.1: Empirical Results: Determinants of Idiosyncratic Risk (VaR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES VaR VaR VaR VaR VaR VaR
ROAA (%) -0.841*** -1.024*** -1.036***
(0.150) (0.153) (0.161)
Price-to-Book Ratio (%) -0.00917*** -0.0117*** -0.0112***
(0.00115) (0.00127) (0.00114)
Non-Interest Income Share (%) 0.0120* 0.0127* 0.00693 0.00309 0.0215** -0.00353
(0.00709) (0.00720) (0.00868) (0.00952) (0.00961) (0.00823)
NII Share (%) X Loan-to-Asset Ratio (%) -0.000227* -0.000344*** -0.000253* -0.000138 -0.000421*** -4.18e-05
(0.000130) (0.000130) (0.000148) (0.000156) (0.000144) (0.000152)
Tier 1 Ratio (%) -0.0598*** -0.107*** -0.0417** -0.104*** -0.0550*** -0.0900***
(0.0203) (0.0201) (0.0195) (0.0213) (0.0166) (0.0189)
Problem Loans Ratio (%) 0.0434** 0.0479** 0.0460** 0.0514*** 0.0542*** 0.0518***
(0.0211) (0.0215) (0.0180) (0.0172) (0.0191) (0.0187)
Real GDP growth rate (%) -0.229*** -0.275*** -0.226*** -0.280*** -0.235*** -0.284***
(0.0267) (0.0302) (0.0264) (0.0291) (0.0269) (0.0286)
ST interest rate (%) 0.116*** 0.108*** 0.180*** 0.222*** 0.186*** 0.226***
(0.0300) (0.0296) (0.0184) (0.0190) (0.0175) (0.0164)
Gov Structural Balance/Potential GDP -0.107*** -0.0835*** -0.124*** -0.0869*** -0.114*** -0.0735***
(0.0179) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0188) (0.0179)
Lerner Index (%) -0.0302*** -0.0444***
(0.00925) (0.00908)
Deposit-to-Liability Ratio (%) -0.0122** -0.00983*
(0.00479) (0.00558)
Leverage Ratio 0.0120 0.0317***
(0.00912) (0.0119)
Weekly Delta CoVaR = L 0.266*** 0.267*** 0.272*** 0.331*** 0.268*** 0.351***
(0.0371) (0.0398) (0.0345) (0.0372) (0.0411) (0.0345)
Observations 3,867 3,833 3,919 3,886 3,922 3,889
Lags 3 - 7 3 - 5 3 - 7 3 - 6 3 - 7 3 - 6
No. of Intruments 390 352 390 342 390 391
No. of Banks 387 386 389 388 389 388
Hansen p-Value 0.425 0.206 0.414 0.113 0.416 0.482
AR2 p-Value 0.000775 7.82e-07 0.00502 2.63e-06 0.00820 3.06e-06
AR3 p-Value 0.00417 2.09e-06 0.00935 3.47e-08 0.0112 7.78e-09
a. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix 5.3 for sources and definitions of the variables.
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Table 3.2: Empirical Results: Determinants of Idiosyncratic Risk (EDF)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES trEDF trEDF trEDF trEDF trEDF trEDF
ROAA (%) -0.218*** -0.231*** -0.207***
(0.0650) (0.0615) (0.0559)
Price-to-Book Ratio (%) -0.000882** -0.000661* -0.000206
(0.000416) (0.000341) (0.000350)
Non-Interest Income Share (%) 0.00647*** 0.0100*** 0.00506* 0.00666** 0.00820*** 0.00395
(0.00233) (0.00271) (0.00281) (0.00332) (0.00257) (0.00332)
NII Share (%) X Loan-to-Asset Ratio (%) -0.000127*** -0.000187*** -0.000130** -0.000172*** -0.000114** -0.000113**
(4.56e-05) (4.53e-05) (5.10e-05) (5.45e-05) (5.70e-05) (5.56e-05)
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 0.000793 -0.0146* 0.00610 -0.00826 -0.00121 -0.00367
(0.00712) (0.00748) (0.00752) (0.00822) (0.00683) (0.00737)
Problem Loans Ratio (%) 0.0303*** 0.0370*** 0.0294*** 0.0338*** 0.0279*** 0.0366***
(0.00493) (0.00570) (0.00499) (0.00567) (0.00445) (0.00546)
Real GDP growth rate (%) -0.0623*** -0.0817*** -0.0615*** -0.0812*** -0.0608*** -0.0816***
(0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0113)
ST interest rate (%) 0.0438*** 0.0434*** 0.0443*** 0.0355*** 0.0414*** 0.0317***
(0.0110) (0.0103) (0.00725) (0.00672) (0.00669) (0.00650)
Gov Structural Balance/Potential GDP -0.0513*** -0.0469*** -0.0513*** -0.0490*** -0.0520*** -0.0524***
(0.00719) (0.00783) (0.00765) (0.00861) (0.00719) (0.00842)
Lerner Index (%) 0.00143 0.00341
(0.00302) (0.00290)
Deposit-to-Liability Ratio (%) -0.000795 -0.00226
(0.00160) (0.00177)
Leverage Ratio -0.000684 0.0144***
(0.00180) (0.00397)
Weekly Delta CoVaR = L 0.578*** 0.623*** 0.583*** 0.628*** 0.601*** 0.625***
(0.0317) (0.0333) (0.0314) (0.0327) (0.0303) (0.0304)
Observations 2,971 2,943 3,013 2,987 3,016 2,990
Lags 3 - 5 3 - 5 3 - 5 3 - 5 3 - 5 3 - 5
No. of Intruments 287 287 287 270 287 287
No. of Banks 290 287 292 289 292 289
Hansen p-Value 0.401 0.417 0.367 0.203 0.351 0.370
AR2 p-Value 0.0397 1.14e-07 0.0770 1.62e-07 0.0150 1.11e-07
AR3 p-Value 0.103 8.06e-05 0.111 0.000125 0.0551 0.000130
a. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix 5.3 for sources and definitions of the variables.
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Table 3.3: Empirical Results: Determinants of the Contribution to Systemic Risk (∆CoV aR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES covar covar covar covar covar covar
ROAA (%) -0.370*** -0.220*** -0.263***
(0.107) (0.0790) (0.0805)
Price-to-Book Ratio (%) -0.00502*** -0.00292*** -0.00348***
(0.00101) (0.000845) (0.00117)
Non-Interest Income Share (%) 0.0432*** 0.0446*** 0.00884 0.0172* 0.0420*** 0.0409***
(0.00899) (0.00882) (0.00946) (0.00899) (0.00863) (0.00894)
NII Share (%) X Loan-to-Asset Ratio (%) -0.000659*** -0.000617*** -0.000412** -0.000495*** -0.000706*** -0.000716***
(0.000166) (0.000177) (0.000181) (0.000187) (0.000176) (0.000184)
Tier 1 Ratio (%) -0.0363 -0.0677*** -0.0324* -0.0544*** -0.0562*** -0.0836***
(0.0221) (0.0188) (0.0171) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0242)
Problem Loans Ratio (%) -0.0267*** -0.0183* -0.0467*** -0.0355*** -0.0261*** -0.0187**
(0.00863) (0.0101) (0.00989) (0.0108) (0.00843) (0.00836)
Real GDP growth rate (%) -0.237*** -0.260*** -0.213*** -0.241*** -0.230*** -0.244***
(0.0298) (0.0295) (0.0286) (0.0285) (0.0283) (0.0287)
ST interest rate (%) 0.0945*** 0.117*** 0.0121 0.0316 0.0491*** 0.0545***
(0.0294) (0.0257) (0.0204) (0.0207) (0.0180) (0.0200)
Gov Structural Balance/Potential GDP -0.138*** -0.132*** -0.171*** -0.152*** -0.133*** -0.131***
(0.0201) (0.0206) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0188) (0.0222)
Lerner Index (%) 0.0156* 0.0186***
(0.00807) (0.00674)
Deposit-to-Liability Ratio (%) -0.0328*** -0.0249***
(0.00636) (0.00589)
Leverage Ratio 0.00945* 0.0279*
(0.00537) (0.0166)
Weekly Delta CoVaR = L 0.134*** 0.140*** 0.127*** 0.138*** 0.146*** 0.154***
(0.0216) (0.0228) (0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0210) (0.0336)
Observations 3,864 3,830 3,916 3,883 3,919 3,886
Lags 2 - 5 2 - 5 2 - 5 2 - 5 2 - 5 3 - 6
No. of Intruments 371 371 371 371 371 342
No. of Banks 386 385 388 387 388 387
Hansen p-Value 0.318 0.370 0.291 0.318 0.336 0.109
AR2 p-Value 0.739 0.354 0.394 0.234 0.589 0.335
a. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. See Appendix 5.3 for sources and definitions of the variables.
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with a higher contribution to systemic risks, and there appears to be diversification
benefits for retail-oriented banks that move into NII activities (hypothesis 2). There is
also evidence that high leverage (hypothesis 3) and an over-reliance on wholesale funding
are associated with higher systemic risks.
It is interesting to note that the Lerner index is positively associated with the contribu-
tion to systemic risk, but negatively associated with idiosyncratic risks37. One potential
explanation is that while higher mark-up is beneficial for banks at the bank-specific level,
it could increase risks at the system level due to the excessive market power of some
banks. This is consistent with the findings for U.S. banks in [ADZ14], which suggest that
higher competition (lower mark-up) reduces systemic risks38.
These empirical findings suggest that the source and the sustainability of bank prof-
itability could carry important financial stability implications. An over-reliance on lever-
age, wholesale funding sources, and market-based NII tends to be associated with higher
idiosyncratic risk and contribution to systemic risks. Consequently, policy makers and
financial stability authorities should pay more attention to the source of bank profitabil-
ity in assessing the resilience of banks to systemic stress. This should also feed into the
design and the calibration of macro-prudential stress tests39. Furthermore, the differen-
tiating impact of competition on idiosyncratic and systemic risks calls for policy makers
to strike a balance between cost reductions (through bank consolidation) and a compet-
37The effect of Lerner index is not driven by bank size. In our sample, the correlation between the
Lerner index and market power are weak (at 0.10). In general, there is mixed evidence between bank
size and bank market power, both theoretically and empirically. Some studies predict a positive relation
(e.g., consider a Cournot competition model). Others predict a negative oneas larger banks tend to
operate on a larger (national or international) market whereas smaller ones locally (e.g., smaller banks
focus on relationship banking, where they exploit higher rents from asymmetric information and higher
switching costs of borrowers). See [BSF06].
38The NPL ratio is found to be positively associated with idiosyncratic risk but negatively associated
with systemic risk. One potential explanation here is that systemic risk is related to the degree of
interconnectedness of one bank with the rest of the market ([DY14, MX17]), and therefore market-
based activities are more influential in banks’ contribution to systemic risk, compared with retail-based
activities that typically determine banks’ problem loan ratios. After controlling for common cyclical
conditions (GDP growth), the problem loan ratio tends to reflect bank-specific risk appetite and risk
management practices, which may be different from that of other banks. As a result, the problem loan
ratio could have a low or negative beta compared with general market movements and could be negatively
associated with banks’ contribution to systemic risks.
39Typically, in a stress testing exercise, bank profitability matters through retained earnings and capital
adequacy. However, more attention could be paid to the source and the sustainability in a systemic risk
analysis of the financial system (for example, by including a detailed profitability analysis alongside the
stress testing exercise).
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itive and stable banking environment. One approach to facilitate a competitive banking
environment is to allow for the entry of new firms instead of raising domestic and foreign
entry barriers into the financial sector to unnecessarily high levels ([ADZ14]).
A number of further robustness checks were carried out, including using various lag-
specifications as instruments in the dynamic panel regression, re-running the regressions
using static panels with fixed effects against lagged independent variables, and including
time dummies (year-fixed effects). The results are found to be robust (see Appendix 5.4
for details).
3.5 Policy Implications and Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship between bank profitability and financial stability,
accounting for bank business models and different NII activities. It also examines the
importance of the various determinants of banking risks and profitability. The paper
first develops a stylized theoretical model that captures bank risks and retail-based and
market-based NII activities. It then estimates a panel regression model for 431 publicly
traded banks from 2004 to 2017.
The stylized theoretical model establishes the analytical relationship between finan-
cial stability and bank profitability, and between financial stability and business models
captured by NII activities. The model predicts that idiosyncratic risks, captured by
the VaR of equity prices and the EDF, are negatively related to both ROAA and long-
term expected profitability (i.e., charter value). Profits reduce risks by providing equity
buffers, and by encouraging prudence and reduced risk-taking. In addition, idiosyncratic
risk rises with the share of NII activities when the LTA ratio is below a certain threshold.
Idiosyncratic risk also increases with the leverage ratio of banks. The theoretical model
also predicts that profitability decreases as the problem loan ratio, operating costs, and
funding costs increase.
The empirical results confirm the theoretical predictions on bank profitability and
financial stability. First, profitability (ROAA) and the price-to-book ratio are negatively
associated with both contribution to systemic risk (∆CoV aR) and idiosyncratic risk
measured by VaR and the EDF of banks. Second, a high NII share tends to be associated
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with higher idiosyncratic risk and contribution to systemic risk when the LTA ratio is low
(i.e., when a bank’s business model is less retail-oriented), as predicted by the theoretical
model. Third, lower competition (high mark-up) is associated with lower idiosyncratic
risk but higher contribution to systemic risk. Fourth, the empirical results suggest that
high leverage and over-reliance on wholesale funding are associated with higher risks.
These findings raise several interesting issues for policy makers and financial stabil-
ity authorities. First, the results highlight the need for a sharper distinction between
different types of NII activities. In general, market-based NII activities are riskier than
retail-based NII activities. This is an important consideration. In a low interest rate envi-
ronment, banks tend to diversify into NII activities, but this causes a shift in a bank’s risk
profile. Second, it would be important to account for the impact of bank consolidation
on competition and systemic risks. Low competition is associated with high contribution
to systemic risk but low idiosyncratic risk. After the recent GFC experience, there was
a rise in mergers and acquisitions between banks. While beneficial for banks at the firm
level, lower competition as measured by a higher Lerner index appears to be negatively
associated with banks’ contribution to systemic risk. From a financial stability policy
viewpoint, the right balance between cost efficiency and a competitive and stable bank-
ing environment is an important consideration. Third, these results highlight the need to
evaluate the sustainability of bank profitability. An over-reliance on leverage and whole-
sale funding are associated with higher idiosyncratic and contribution to systemic risks
and thereby lower financial stability. Policy makers and financial stability authorities
should pay more attention to the source and the sustainability of bank profitability in
the design and the calibration of macro-prudential stress tests and systemic risk analysis.
These findings also underscore the importance of the effective and timely implementa-
tion of the Basel III framework, the need for well calibrated macro-prudential tools, and
to ensure that banks’ reliance on wholesale funding and leverage remains prudentially
manageable.
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CHAPTER 4
Appendix I
4.1 Data Development and Selection
4.1.1 Compustat Firm Data Selection
Table 4.1: Sample Selection for Compustat Data
Selection SIC Obs Firms
Compustat 378,983 32,467
− Financials 6000-6999 287,321 23,888
− Argricultural 0-999 285,954 23,761
− Public Service 9000-9999 280,291 23,225
− R&D=0 for its entire operation periods 148,290 11,395
4.1.2 PatentsView Patent Data Selection
Classification of assignee: 2 - US Company or Corporation, 3 - Foreign Company or
Corporation, 4 - US Individual, 5 - Foreign Individual, 6 - US Government, 7 - Foreign
Government, 8 - Country Government, 9 - State Government (US). Note: “A” or “1”
appearing before any of these codes signifies part interest.
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Table 4.2: Sample Selection for Unmatched Patent Data
Selection Criteria Obs Selection Criteria Obs
Patent 6,408,293 Application 6,422,963
Country =US 6,408,291 Series code 6=29 5,993,792
Type =Utility 5,807,528
Kind =A,B1,B2 5,807,519
Selection Criteria Obs Selection Criteria Obs
Assignee 379,565 Merged Patents Files 6,162,134
Type =2 167,986 Assignee Missing Info 5,354,027
Organization Missing name 167,741 Type =2 2,657,303
Citation data Matched 2,560,204
Application year < 1975 or > 2017 2,536,585
4.1.3 Firm-Patent Name Matching
Table 4.3: Name Matching Process
Step Criteria Fuzzy Match Obs Cumulative Matches File
0 11,398 getCompName.do
1 standard name N 5,278
2 stem name N 6,635
3 stem name Y 992 7,304 match ass.py
4 merged with cleaned patent data 6,705 clean patent.do
Note that in Step 3, the number of matches with ratio ≥ 95 is 468, which I keep with
certainty. Matches with ratio < 95 but ≥ 93, I check one by one manually. I only kept
201 of them (524).
By matching application year-firm (gvkey) pairs and corresponding fiscal year-firm
(gvkey) pairs data from Compustat, the total number of matched patents is 810,451
(unmatched 1,749,753), of firms 4,630 and of firm-years 70,004.
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Table 4.4: Selection for Matched PatentsView-Compustat Data
Criteria Obs Firms Patents
total firm-patent-year obs 929,003 11,395 862,038
total firm-year obs 147,850 11,395 862,038
Patent=0 for its entire operation periods 70,004 4630 862,038
1997-2016 data 35,691 3,482 604,193
Continuous innovating from 97-16 31,895 3,187 569,304
4.2 Additional Statistics
Total number of observations is 1,040.
Table 4.5: Summary Statistics (Fiscal Year 2015)
Mean Median St. Dev.
Employee 10,071 660 32,508
Revenue (mil $) 4,320 200 18,113
R&D expense (mil $) 253 28 1,019
R&D Exp/Net sales 9.74% 13.20% 79.56%
Pre-tax income/Net sales -20.98 0.00 232.48
Growth rate of net sales 3.93% 2.77% 62.50%
Patents applied 13.36 1.00 130.03
Self-citation ratio 14.28% 8.67% 18.17%
We can see firms get bigger, especially after 2011 and for the top half of firms.
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Table 4.6: Percentiles of Size Distribution
Percentile 1997 2002 2007 2011 2016
10 44 40 38 27 26
20 87 93 91 80 73
30 143 152 165 165 131
40 235 250 290 346 290
50 372 431 496 614 630
60 716 793 951 1300 1475
70 1444 1577 2000 2735 3085
80 3360 3522 4700 5672 6966
90 9100 8600 13355 16000 17678
Figure 4.1: Innovation Capacity by Firm Size
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Figure 4.2: Firm Entry and Exit Rates by Year
4.3 Equilibrium Prices and Profits
4.3.1 Final Goods Production
Omitting t
max
{yj}
A
(∫ 1
0
yj(t)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
−
∫ 1
0
pjyjdj
F.O.C. w.r.t. yj
pj = A
1−1/
(
Y
yj
)1/
.
4.3.2 Intermediate goods production
Π(n, z) = max
{yj}j∈J
∑
j∈J
[pjyj − w
z
yj] = max{yj}j∈J
∑
j∈J
[A1−1/Y 1/y1−1/j −
w
z
yj]
Therefore
yj =
[
(− 1)z
w
]
Y A−1. (4.1)
By substituting (4.1) into final good production (2.6), we have
w = A
− 1

z¯ (4.2)
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where z¯ ≡
[∫M
0
∑
j∈Jf z
−1
f df
] 1
−1
=
[∫ 1
0
z−1j dj
] 1
−1
.
Using (4.2) to rewrite yj in terms of zˆ = z/z¯, we have
yj = zˆ
A−1Y and pj = Azˆ−1 and lj = yj/z = zˆ−1A−1Y/z¯.
Therefore net sales is pjyj = zˆ
−1Y and profit pij = pjyj − wlj = zˆ−1Y/ and
Π(n, z) = npij = nY zˆ
−1/.
4.3.3 Labor Market Clearing
From labor market clearing
∫ 1
0
ljdj = 1, we have
Y = Az¯.
Thus,
Π(n, z) = npij = nY zˆ
−1/ = nz¯Azˆ−1/.
The profit share of total output is, using the fact that
∫ 1
0
zˆ−1j dj = 1,
∫ 1
0
pijdj
Y
=
Y/
Y
= 1/
and labor income share is 1− 1/.
4.3.4 Euler Equation
From the maximization problem of households, we have the standard Euler equation
g =
C˙
C
=
Y˙
Y
=
˙¯z
z¯
=
r − ρ
θ
.
4.4 Lemma and Proof
Lemma 1
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Proof. The firm’s value function V(n, zˆ, z¯) is defined as
rV(n, zˆ, z¯) = max
kI ,kx
nz¯Azˆ−1/︸ ︷︷ ︸
profit
−n(kI zˆ−1 + kx)z¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
R&D cost
+ FI(kI)[V(n, zˆ(1 + λ), z¯)−V(n, zˆ, z¯)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
return from internal R&D
+ nτ [V(n− 1, zˆ, z¯)−V(n, zˆ, z¯)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
creative destruction
+ nFx(kx, n)
[
Ezˆ′V(n+ 1,
nzˆ + zˆ′(1 + η)
n+ 1
, z¯)−V(n, zˆ, z¯)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
return from external R&D
− ∂V
∂zˆ
(n, zˆ, z¯)gzˆ +
∂V
∂z¯
(n, zˆ, z¯)gz¯
+ ϕ
[
ιAzˆ−1/− kI zˆ−1 − kx
]
nz¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
financial constraint
where the second- and third-to-last terms use ˙¯z = gz¯ and ˙ˆz = −gzˆ in balance growth
path equilibrium.
We can easily verify that V(n, zˆ, z¯) = z¯V (n, zˆ), where V (n, zˆ) is defined in (2.16).

Lemma 2
Proof. For a some time interval ∆, the evolution of the aggregated productivity z¯ is given
by
z¯−1(t+ ∆) =
∫ ∞
0
z−1φ˜t+∆(z)dz
=
∫ ∞
0
[
∆τ(z(1 + η))−1 + ∆I˜(z)(z(1 + λ))−1 + (1−∆τ −∆I˜(z))z−1
]
φ˜t(z)dz
where φ˜t(z) is the marginal distribution of z at time t, and I˜(z) is the internal innovation
rate by firms with productivity z.
The differential becomes
z¯−1(t+ ∆)− z¯−1(t)
∆
=∫ ∞
0
[
τ((z(1 + η))−1 − z−1) + I˜(z)((z(1 + λ))−1 − z−1)
]
φ˜t(z)dz.
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Normalizing by dividing both sides by z¯−1(t), it becomes
z¯−1(t+ ∆)− z¯−1(t)
∆z¯−1(t)
=∫ ∞
0
[
τ((zˆ(1 + η))−1 − zˆ−1) + I(zˆ)((zˆ(1 + λ))−1 − zˆ−1)]φt(zˆ)dzˆ
where φ(q) =
∑∞
n=1 h(n, q) is the unconditional distribution of zˆ
and I(zˆ) = M
∑∞
n=1 FI(kI(n, zˆ))h(n, zˆ)/φ(zˆ) is the internal innovation rate condi-
tional on being type zˆ firms.
Take ∆ to 0. We have
g =
agg. external R&D and entry︷ ︸︸ ︷
τEzˆ
[
(zˆ(1 + η))−1 − zˆ−1]+ agg. internal R&D︷ ︸︸ ︷Ezˆ {I(zˆ) [(zˆ(1 + λ))−1 − zˆ−1]}
− 1 .
Simplify and using Ezˆ(zˆ−1) = 1, we have equation (2.20).
The aggregate creative destruction rate τ is derived from the definition.

Lemma 3
Proof. When kx > 0, from the FOC of intermediate goods producers’ value function
nzˆ−1(1 + ϕ) = αIβIk
βI−1
I [V (n, zˆ(1 + λ))− V (n, zˆ)]
n(1 + ϕ) = αxβxk
βx−1
x n
γ+1
[
Ezˆ′V (n+ 1,
nzˆ + zˆ′(1 + η)
n+ 1
)− V (n, zˆ)
]
ιAzˆ−1/ ≥ kI zˆ−1 + kx + Φ with equality when ϕ > 0.
Then we have
k∗I =
[
αIβI [V (n, zˆ(1 + λ))− V (n, zˆ)]
nzˆ−1(1 + ϕ)
] 1
1−βI
k∗x =
[
αxβx[Ezˆ′V (n+ 1, nzˆ+zˆ
′(1+η)
n+1
)− V (n, zˆ)]
n−γ(1 + ϕ)
] 1
1−βx

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Lemma 5 (Firm Growth Rate). Let gf ≡ E
(
Q˙f/Qf
)
be the average growth rate of a
firm with nzˆ−1 ≡ Qf . Then in equilibrium,
gf =
nx(n, zˆ)
{
(n+ 1)E
[(
nzˆ+(1+η)zˆ′
n+1
)−1]
−Qf
}
Qf
+ I(n, zˆ)λ− τ (4.3)
where x(n, zˆ) = Fx(kx(n, zˆ)) and I(n, zˆ) = FI(kI(n, zˆ)).
Proof. Consider a small time interval ∆, then Qf = nzˆ
−1 follows
Qf (t+ ∆) =nx(n, zˆ)∆(n+ 1)E
{[
nzˆ + (1 + η)zˆ′
n+ 1
]−1}
+ I(n, zˆ)∆[Qf (t)(1 + λ)]
+nτ∆[Qf (t)− Qf (t)
n
]
+(1− nx(n, zˆ)∆− I(n, zˆ)∆− nτ∆)Qf (t)
where x(n, zˆ) = Fx(kx(n, zˆ)) and I(n, zˆ) = FI(kI(n, zˆ)).
Subtract Qf (t) from both sides of the equation, divide both sides by ∆Qf (t), and
then take ∆ to 0, we have Equation (4.3), using the fact that gf = lim∆→0
Qf (t+∆)−Qf (t)
∆Qf (t)
.

Lemma 6 (Stationary Distribution). Denote the joint distribution by H(n, zˆ) = Prob(q ≤
zˆ, n˜ = n). Its density h(n, zˆ) satisfies the Kolmogorov forward equation (for n ≥ 2)
h˙(n, zˆ) =
−
[
I(n, zˆ)h(n, zˆ)− 1
1 + λ
I(n,
zˆ
1 + λ
)h(n,
zˆ
1 + λ
)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflow due to internal R&D
−nx(n, zˆ)h(n, zˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-sized firm to n+1
− nτh(n, zˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n-size firm to n−1
+
∫ nzˆ
1+η
0
(n− 1)x(n− 1, nzˆ − q(1 + η)
n− 1 )h(n− 1,
nzˆ − q(1 + η)
n− 1 )φ(q)dq︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflow due to external R&D by size n−1 firms
+ (n+ 1)τh(n+ 1, zˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
creative destruction of size-n+1 firms
+
∂[gzˆh(n, zˆ)]
∂zˆ︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin
(4.4)
where x(n, q) = Fx(kX(n, q), n), I(n, q) = FI(KI(n, q)) and q ∼ φ(q) =
∑∞
n=1 h(n, q).
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One can derive a similar equation for n = 1.
The total measure of firms M satisfies
1 = M
∞∑
n=1
n
∫ ∞
0
h(n, zˆ)dzˆ.
Proof. for n ≥ 2
Consider banks with = n and ≤ zˆ
Outflow
1. n-sized firms internally innovate to > zˆ
2. n-sized firms externally innovate to n+ 1
3. n-sized firms are creatively destructed to n− 1.
Inflow
1. (n− 1)-sized firms externally innovate to = n but ≤ zˆ
2. Firms with = n+ 1,≤ zˆ are creatively destructed to = n
3. Firms with = zˆ become < zˆ when they fail to innovate as z¯ grows.
Let x(n, q) = Fx(kX(n, q), n) and I(n, q) = FI(KI(n, q)). Consider a small time
interval from t to t+ ∆
Ht+∆(n, zˆ) = Ht(n, zˆ(1 + g∆))
−
∫ (1+g∆)zˆ
zˆ(1+g∆)/(1+λ)
∆I(n, q)h(n, q)dq︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflow due to internal R&D
−
∫ zˆ(1+g∆)
0
∆nx(n, q)h(n, q)dq︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflow: n-sized firm external R&D to n+1
− ∆nτHt(n, zˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
out: creative destruction of n-sized firm
+ ∆X(n− 1, zˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflow due to external R&D by size =n−1 firms
+ (n+ 1)∆τH(n+ 1, zˆ(1 + g∆))︸ ︷︷ ︸
creative destruction of size-n+1 firms
(4.5)
where
100
X(n− 1, zˆ) =
∫ zˆ
0
∫ ∞
0
(n− 1)x(n− 1, nz˜ − q
′(1 + η)
n− 1 )h(n− 1,
nz˜ − q′(1 + η)
n− 1 )φ(q
′)dq′dz˜
q ∼ φ(q) =
∞∑
n=1
h(n, q) the marginal distribution of zˆ.
Note that the second-to-last line comes from the convolution formula.
1. After a successful external innovation of a firm of size = n− 1, its post-innovation
productivity should be z˜ ≤ zˆ.
2. Let its original productivity be q and the productivity of the product line it cre-
atively destructs be q′; therefore, we need nz˜ ≡ (n− 1)q + q′(1 + η) < nzˆ.
3. q′ is random draw from the average relative productivity distribution H(zˆ), so q′ is
independent of q.
4. The pdf of the new productivity z˜ follows
∫ ∞
0
(n− 1)x(n− 1, nz˜ − q
′(1 + η)
n− 1 )h(n− 1,
nz˜ − q′(1 + η)
n− 1 )φ(q
′)dq′.
5. Therefore, the total outflow due to external innovation is
∫ zˆ
0
∫ ∞
0
(n− 1)x(n− 1, nz˜ − q
′(1 + η)
n− 1 )h(n− 1,
nz˜ − q′(1 + η)
n− 1 )φ(q
′)dq′dz˜.
Subtracting both sides of (4.5) by Ht(n, zˆ), dividing both sides by ∆, taking ∆ to 0,
and using the fact that
lim
∆→0
Ht+∆(n, zˆ)−Ht(n, zˆ)
∆
≡ H˙(n, zˆ)
and
lim
∆→0
Ht(n, zˆ(1 + g∆))−Ht(n, zˆ)
∆
= gzˆh(n, zˆ)
we can derive the flow equation.
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H˙(n, zˆ) =
−
∫ zˆ
zˆ/(1+λ)
I(n, q)h(n, q)dq −
∫ zˆ
0
nx(n, q)h(n, q)dq
− τnH(n, zˆ) +X(n− 1, zˆ) + (n+ 1)τH(n+ 1, zˆ) + gzˆh(n, zˆ).
Now differentiate w.r.t. zˆ using the Leibniz integral rule
h˙(n, zˆ) =
−
[
I(n, zˆ)h(n, zˆ)− 1
1 + λ
I(n,
zˆ
1 + λ
)h(n,
zˆ
1 + λ
)
]
− n(x(n, zˆ) + τ)h(n, zˆ)
+ %(n− 1, zˆ) + (n+ 1)τh(n+ 1, zˆ) + ∂[gzˆh(n, zˆ)]
∂zˆ
%(n− 1, zˆ) =
∫ nzˆ
1+η
0
(n− 1)x(n− 1, nzˆ − q(1 + η)
n− 1 )h(n− 1,
nzˆ − q(1 + η)
n− 1 )φ(q)dq
q ∼ φ(q) =
∞∑
n=1
h(n, q) the marginal distribution of zˆ.
For n = 1, we have
H˙(1, zˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
net flow
=−
∫ zˆ
zˆ/(1+λ)
I(1, q)h(1, q)dq︸ ︷︷ ︸
outflow due to internal R&D
−
[∫ zˆ
0
x(1, q)h(1, q)dq + τH(1, zˆ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
external R&D and creative destruction
+xe
∫ zˆ/(1+η)
0
φ(q)dq︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflow from entrants
+ 2τH(2, zˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
creative destruction of size 2 firms
+ gzˆh(1, zˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
extensive margin
.
So the Kolmogorov forward equation is
h˙(1, zˆ) =−
[
I(1, zˆ)h(1, zˆ)− 1
1 + λ
I(1,
zˆ
1 + λ
)h(1,
zˆ
1 + λ
)
]
− x(1, zˆ)h(1, zˆ)− τh(1, zˆ)
+ xeφ(zˆ/(1 + η)) + 2τh(2, zˆ) +
∂[gzˆh(1, zˆ)]
∂zˆ
.

Proposition 1
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Proof. From Lemma 3, a firm with given (n, zˆ) will have
kI
kx
∝ (1 + ϕ) 11−βx− 11−βI
kI
kx
is increasing in ϕ if and only if βx > βI .

4.5 Myopic Firm Problem
This section lays out the analysis for a myopic profit maximizing firm to derive closed-
form solutions.
For a small time interval ∆, a myopic firm maximizes one-period ahead payoffs
max
kI ,kx
∆[Π(n, zˆ)− n(kI zˆ−1 + kx)]
+ (1− r∆)∆FI(kI)[Π(n, zˆ(1 + λ))− Π(n, zˆ)]
+ (1− r∆)∆nFx(kx, n)
{
Ezˆ′Π
[
n+ 1,
nzˆ + zˆ′(1 + η)
n+ 1
]
− Π(n, zˆ)
}
+ (1− r∆)∆nτ [Π(n− 1, zˆ)− Π(n, zˆ)]
+ (1− r∆)Π(n, zˆ)
s.t.
ιAnzˆ−1/ ≥ n(kI zˆ−1 + kx).
Keeping only terms related to kI and kx, factor out ∆ and take ∆→ 0, we have
max
kI ,kx
− n(kI zˆ−1 + kx)
+ FI(kI)[Π(n, zˆ(1 + λ))− Π(n, zˆ)]
+ nFx(kx, n)
{
Ezˆ′Π
[
n+ 1,
nzˆ + zˆ′(1 + η)
n+ 1
]
− Π(n, zˆ)
}
.
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Using Π(n, zˆ) = nAzˆ−1/ ≡ npi(zˆ) where pi(zˆ) = Azˆ−1/, we have
max
kI ,kx
− (kI zˆ−1 + kx + Φ · 1kx>0)
+ FI(kI)[pi(zˆ(1 + λ))− pi(zˆ)]
+ Fx(kx, n)
{
(n+ 1)Ezˆ′pi
[
nzˆ + zˆ′(1 + η)
n+ 1
]
− npi(zˆ)
}
+ ϕ[ιpi(zˆ)− (kI zˆ−1 + kx].
(4.6)
When  = 2, we then have linear profit functions. Furthermore, set A = 1. Then the
maximization problem (4.6) becomes
max
kI ,kx
FI(kI)zˆλ+ Fx(kx, n)(1 + η)− (kI zˆ + kx) + ϕ[ιAzˆ/2− (kI zˆ + kx)].
Note that now ¯ˆz = 1 when  = 2
max
kI ,kx
αIk
βI
I zˆλ+ αxk
βx
x n
γ(1 + η)− (kI zˆ + kx) + ϕ[ιzˆ/2− (kI zˆ + kx)].
F.O.Cs for firms with n ≥ 1
k∗I =
[
αIβIλ
1 + ϕ
] 1
1−βI
and k∗x =
[
αxβx(1 + η)n
γ
1 + ϕ
] 1
1−βx
.
where ϕ is the shadow price of the financial constraint
ιzˆ/2 ≥ kI zˆ + kx
Applying Lemma 5, the firm growth rate when  = 2 (linear profit function) is
gf (Qf ) = gf (nzˆ) =
Fx(kx(n, zˆ))(1 + η)
zˆ
+ FI(kI(n, zˆ))λ− τ. (4.7)
Disproportional Growth Rate: Deviation from Gibrat’s Law
When ι is sufficiently large, ϕ = 0. In this case, k∗I = (αIβIλ)
1
1−βI and FI(kI) =
αI(αIβIλ)
βI
1−βI . Also, k∗x = (αxβx(1+η)n
γ)
1
1−βx and Fx(kx, n) = αx(αxβx(1+η))
βx
1−βx n−
2−βx
1−βx
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Accordingly, gf =
Cx
n
2−βx
1−βx zˆ
+ CI − τ is decreasing in both n and zˆ, where Cx and CI
are two constants. Cx = αx(1 + η)(αxβx(1 + η))
βx
1−βx and CI = λαI(αIβIλ)
βI
1−βI . Thus,
∂gf
∂Q
=
∂gf
∂n
∂n
∂Q
+
∂gf
∂zˆ
∂zˆ
∂Q
< 0.
This is the case analyzed in [AK15] where smaller firms grow faster.
Proportional Growth Rate: Gibrat’s Law
Consider ϕ > 0.
Then gf =
Cx
n
2−βx
1−βx zˆ(1+ϕ)
βx
1−βx
+ CI/(1 + ϕ)
βI
1−βI − τ . It is easy to see that ∂gf
∂ϕ
< 0.
From the financial constraint we can see ϕ is defined by the implicit function
G(ϕ, zˆ, n) = zˆ − c1zˆ(1 + ϕ)
−1
1−βI − c2[n(1 + ϕ)]
−1
1−βx (4.8)
where c1 = (αIβIλ)
1
1−βI /(0.5ι) and c2 = (αxβx(1 + η))
1
1−βx /(0.5ι) are two positive
constants.
It is straightforward to show that ∂G
∂ϕ
= c1
1−βI zˆ(1+ϕ)
−2+βI
1−βI + c2
1−βxn
−1
1−βx (1+ϕ)
−2+βx
1−βx > 0
and ∂G
∂n
= c2
1−βx (1 + ϕ)
−1
1−βx n
−2+βx
1−βx . Also, ∂G
∂zˆ
= 1 − c1(1 + ϕ)
−1
1−βI > 0, because zˆ ≥
c1zˆ(1 + ϕ)
−1
1−βI + c2[n(1 + ϕ)]
−1
1−βx > c1zˆ(1 + ϕ)
−1
1−βI .
By implicit function theorem,
∂ϕ
∂zˆ
= −∂G
∂zˆ
/
∂G
∂ϕ
< 0
∂ϕ
∂n
= −∂G
∂n
/
∂G
∂ϕ
< 0.
In addition,
∂gf
∂zˆ
= − Cx
n
2−βx
1−βx zˆ2(1 + ϕ)
βx
1−βx
+
∂gf
∂ϕ
∂ϕ
∂zˆ
∂gf
∂n
= −2− βx
1− βx
Cx
n
3−2βx
1−βx zˆ(1 + ϕ)
βx
1−βx
+
∂gf
∂ϕ
∂ϕ
∂n
.
Because the first term is negative while the second positive, the signs of
∂gf
∂zˆ
and
∂gf
∂n
become ambiguous. When
∂gf
∂Q
= 0, we will return to the case [KK04] where the
unconditional growth rate follows Gibrat’s law: growth rate is independent of size.
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4.6 Computational Details
4.6.1 Discretized Joint Distribution h(n, zˆ)
(1) Discretize the n− zˆ grid.
(2) Calculate the transition matrix P.
For each n− zˆ pair, it can transit to
1. n and zˆ 1+λ
1+g∆t
with probability FI∆t = αIk
βI
I ∆t
2. n+1 and nzˆ
(n+1)(1+g∆t)
+ q(1+η)
(n+1)(1+g∆t)
with probability nFxφ(q)∆t = n
γ+1αxk
βx
x φ(q)∆t
where φ(zˆ) is the marginal distribution of zˆ
3. n− 1 and zˆ
1+g∆t
with probability τ∆t
4. n and zˆ
1+g∆t
with probability ∆t
5. n and zˆ with probability 1− FI∆t− nFx∆t− τ∆t−∆t .
Because updated zˆ will not land on the grid points exactly, I use the following approx-
imation: Suppose a < zˆ < b where a, b are adjacent grid points. Then the probability
of hitting a is zˆ−a
b−a and b is
b−zˆ
b−a . Also, the index of a, b on the grid is
⌊
log(zˆ/z)
log(1+∆z)
⌋
and⌈
log(zˆ/z)
log(1+∆z)
⌉
.
Also, boundaries are reflective.
(3) Calculate the stationary distribution of n− zˆ, h
h = hP.
h is the left eigenvector of P. Note that the stationary distribution of this Markov
Chain exists and it is unique, since P is aperiodic and irreducible.
4.6.2 Value Functions
Given function inputs n, zˆ, g, τ, φ(zˆ) and Ω, we have the following iteration algorithm
V i+1(·) = TV
{
V i(·)} ≡ V i(·) + ∆HJB(V i(·))
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where TV describes the Bellman operator and the HJB equation is defined as
HJB[V (·)] = (g − r)V (n, zˆ) + max
kI ,kx
{Anzˆ−1/− n(zˆ−1kI + kx)
+ FI(kI)[V (n, zˆ(1 + λ))− V (n, zˆ)]
+ nτ [V (n− 1, zˆ)− V (n, zˆ)]
+ nFx(kx, n)
[
Ezˆ′V (n+ 1,
nzˆ + zˆ′(1 + η)
n+ 1
)− V (n, zˆ)
]
− ∂V
∂zˆ
(n, zˆ)gzˆ + ϕ
[
ιAzˆ−1/− kI zˆ−1 − kx
]
n}.
Neural Network Representation
Denote the state space for the neural network by XV = {n, zˆ, g, τ, φ(zˆ),Ω}. Denote the
respective neural network representation by V (XV ; ΘV ).
Start
1. A random draw of inputs (I use 20,000 draws) XV
2. Initial guess of value function.
In each iteration:
1. Calculate the value function according to the last iteration’s output V i(XV ).
2. Calculate the results from the HJB equation (which also uses the last round’s value
function in the calculation) HJBi(XV ).
3. Calculate the “target” for the neural network as V i + ∆HJBi.
4. Train the neural network to fit the target.
5. The trained network is a representation of value function; call it V i+1.
6. Repeat until convergence.
The neural network is calibrated with the following hyper-parameters in Table 4.7.
The machine-learning packages, TensorFlow and Keras, do most of the heavy-lifting
of training the neural network. I only need to write out the discretized HJB equation.
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Algorithm 1: Value Function Algorithm
Input : Uniform random draw of S = {(si)|si = n, zˆ;φ(zˆ), g, τ,Ω}
Output: Converged value functions V (n, zˆ;φ(zˆ), g, τ,Ω}
i← 0, ε← 10
while i < max and  > tol do
target ← ∆t ·HJB(V i(S)) + V i(S) ; /* When converged, HJB(V i(S)) = 0
*/
V i+1(·) ← model.fit(S,target)
ε =
∑
si
|HJB(V i+1(si))|
i← i+ 1
end
Table 4.7: Neural Network Hyper Parameters
Parameters Value
Hidden Layers 3
Hidden Units [100,100,100]
Activation Function Leaky ReLu
Batch Normalization No
Gradient Descent ADAM
Learning Rate 1e-4 to 1e-5
Batch Size 100 - 2000
Epoch 10 - 200
dt 0.07, 0.02, 0.01
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CHAPTER 5
Appendix II
5.1 Selected Literature Review
This review surveys recent research on bank profitability and financial stability from
theoretical, empirical, and policy perspectives. We focus on three areas that are closest to
our analysis on the determinants of risks and bank profitability. The key determinants can
be grouped into three main types: 1) bank business models, including the role of NII and
bank characteristics; 2) cyclical conditions and structural factors, including concentration
and competition; and 3) policy factors in influencing bank profitability and financial
stability.
The literature on bank business models examines bank performance and risks across
different business models. An important aspect of diversification in business model em-
phasized in the literature is the implication of NII activities, which has shown mixed
evidence. Most empirical studies on U.S. banks conclude that increased reliance on NII
has little to no impact on lifting bank profits and offsetting the debilitating effect of return
volatilities (e.g., [DR01, Sti07, SR06, CL09, ECB15]). International studies, particularly
those of European banks, paint a brighter picture and suggest a “diversification pre-
mium”, implying that banks with more diversified revenue streams are more profitable,
but the benefit of NII is still debatable (e.g., [BDV07, EHH10, SW11, CT10, LNR08,
Koh14]).
Some recent papers propose a more nuanced and non-linear relationship between in-
come diversification and risks. NII activities are found to be beneficial when the NII share
is low ([BR16, DH10]), or when banks are small ([DDS15, AMT18]). Furthermore, based
on supervisory data in Germany, [Koh14] found that diversification into NII activities
were more beneficial for retail-oriented banks such as savings and cooperative banks. Us-
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ing U.S. banking “call reports”, [DT13] concluded that the probability of distressed bank
failure declined with pure fee-based NII activities but increased with asset-based NII like
investment banking and securitization. Besides bank idiosyncratic return and risks, NIIs
are also shown to increase systemic risks of the banking sector ([DDS15, BDP11, EMS14]).
5.2 Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proposition 3
Proof. Start from EDF. At optimal, EDF ≡ 1−q∗ = 1−Φ(µ∗pi+e
σ∗pi
). So ∂q
∗
∂µ∗pi
=
φ(
µ∗pi+e
σ∗pi )
σ∗pi
> 0,
and thus
∂EDF
∂µ∗pi
= − ∂q
∗
∂µ∗pi
< 0
VaR is defined by an implicit function F (V aR, µpi, σpi), where
F = Φ(−V aR−µ
∗
pi−e
σ∗pi
)− 0.05 = 0
To ease notation, denote −V aR−µ
∗
pi−e
σ∗pi
= C1
∂F
∂V aR
= − 1
σ∗pi
φ(C1) < 0
∂F
∂µ∗pi
= − 1
σ∗pi
φ(C1) < 0
By implicit function theorem,
∂V aR
∂µ∗pi
= −
∂F
∂µ∗pi
∂F
∂V aR
< 0

Lemma 7. q∗ and VaR are decreasing in the standard deviation of ROA (σ∗pi) if µ
∗
pi+e > .
∂q∗
∂σ∗pi
< 0 and
∂V aR
∂σ∗pi
< 0 if µ∗pi + e > 
Proof.
∂q∗
∂σ∗pi
= −φ(µ
∗
pi + e
σ∗pi
)
µ∗pi + e
σ∗2pi
< 0
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Also
∂F
∂σ∗pi
=
V aR + µ∗pi + e
σ∗2pi
φ(C1) > 0
By the implicit function theorem,
∂V aR
∂σ∗pi
= −
∂F
∂σ∗pi
∂F
∂V aR
> 0

Lemma 8. The (expected) ROA µ∗pi is increasing in the LTA ratio l, under certain regu-
larity conditions.
∂µ∗pi
∂l
< 0 if l <
1
1 + k
and x < 1 +
(rm − cm)(1−αα k − 1) + 1−αα kcr
rL
Proof.
µ∗pi =

(1− x)rLl + rr(1− l)αl1−α − cr(1− l)− cf − rD(1− e) if l ≥ 11+k
(1− x)rLl + (rm − cm)(1− l − kl) + rrkαl − crkl − cf − rD(1− e) if l < 11+k
If l < 1
1+k
,
∂µ∗pi
∂l
= (1− x)rL + (rm − cm)(1 + k) + rrkα − crk
where k =
(
αrr
cr+rm−cm
) 1
1−α
.
Note that rrk
α− crk = k(rrkα−1− cr) = kα [cr(1− α) + rm− cm]. Therefore ∂µ
∗
pi
∂l
> 0 if
and only if (1 − x)rL + (rm − cm)(1 + k) + kα [cr(1 − α) + rm − cm] = (1 − x)rL + (rm −
cm)(
1−α
α
k − 1) + 1−α
α
kcr > 0. Equivalently, when
x < 1 +
(rm − cm)(1−αα k − 1) + 1−αα kcr
rL
A sufficient condition will be k > α
1−α

Lemma 9. The standard deviation ROA σ∗pi is increasing in the LTA ratio l, under
certain regularity conditions.
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∂σ∗pi
∂l
< 0 if l < l =
(1 + k)σ2m
(1− x)2σ2L + (1 + k)2σ2m + k2ασ2r
<
1
1 + k
Proof.
σ∗pi =

(1− x)2l2σ2L + (1− l)2αl2−2ασ2r if l ≥ 11+k
(1− x)2l2σ2L + (1− l − kl)2σ2m + k2αl2σ2r if l < 11+k
If l < 1
1+k
,
∂σ2∗pi
∂l
= [2(1− x)2σ2L + 2(1 + k)2σ2m + 2k2ασ2r ]l − 2(1 + k)σ2m < 0
if and only if
l < l =
(1 + k)σ2m
(1− x)2σ2L + (1 + k)2σ2m + k2ασ2r
=
1
(1−x)2σ2L
(1+k)σ2m
+ (1 + k) + k
2ασ2r
(1+k)σ2m
<
1
1 + k
Therefore,
∂σ∗pi
∂l
=
1
2σ∗pi
∂σ2∗pi
∂l
< 0

Proposition 4.
Proof. Based on the proof of propostion 3, Lemma 7, 8 and 9, we have
∂EDF
∂n
= −∂EDF
∂l
=
∂q∗
∂l
=
∂q∗
∂µ∗pi
∂µ∗pi
∂l
+
∂q∗
∂σ∗pi
∂σpi
∗
∂l
> 0
∂V aR
∂n
= −∂EDF
∂l
= −∂V aR
∂µ∗pi
∂µ∗pi
∂l
− ∂V aR
∂σ∗pi
∂σpi
∗
∂l
> 0
when x < 1 +
(rm−cm)( 1−αα k−1)+ 1−αα kcr
rL
. Also,
∂EDF
∂s
=
∂EDF
∂n
∂n
∂s
> 0
∂V aR
∂s
=
∂V aR
∂n
∂n
∂s
> 0

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Corollary 6.1. EDF and VaR are decreasing E/A = e (increasing in leverage 1/e )
∂EDF
∂e
< 0
∂V aR
∂e
< 0
Proof. Similar to the proof in proposition 3
∂EDF
∂e
= −∂q
∗
∂e
= −
φ(µ
∗
pi+e
σ∗pi
)
σ∗pi
< 0
and
∂F
∂e
= − 1
σ∗pi
φ(C1) < 0
By implicit function theorem,
∂V aR
∂e
= −
∂F
∂e
∂F
∂V aR
< 0

Proposition 5
Proof. Start from EDF. At optimal, EDF ′ ≡ 1− q∗ = 1− p ∗
[
Φ(µ
∗
pi+e
σ∗pi
)− Φ(µ∗pi+e−
σ∗pi
)
]
+
Φ(µ
∗
pi+e−
σ∗pi
)
To ease notation, denote B =
[
Φ(µ
∗
pi+e
σ∗pi
)− Φ(µ∗pi+e−
σ∗pi
)
]
> 0, so
p∗ =
+Bev
b
q∗ = p∗B + Φ(
µ∗pi + e− 
σ∗pi
)
Thus,
∂EDF ′
∂v
=
∂q∗
∂v
= −B∂p
∗
∂v
= −eB
2
b
< 0
VaR’ is defined by an implicit function F (V aR′, µpi, σpi, v), where
F = Φ
(−V aR′ − µ∗pi − e
σ∗pi
)
p∗ + Φ
(−V aR′ − µ∗pi − e+ 
σ∗pi
)
(1− p∗)− 0.05 = 0
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Denote −V aR
′−µ∗pi−e
σ∗pi
= C1 and
−V aR′−µ∗pi−e+
σ∗pi
= C2 > C1
∂F
∂V aR′
= − p
∗
σ∗pi
φ(C1)− 1− p
∗
σ∗pi
φ(C2) < 0
∂F
∂v
= −∂p
∗
∂v
[Φ(C2)− Φ(C1)] < 0
By implicit function theorem,
∂V aR
∂v
= −
∂F
∂v
∂F
∂V aR′
< 0

Proposition 6
Proof. Note that
∂B
∂e
=
[
φ(µ
∗
pi+e
σ∗pi
)− φ(µ∗pi+e−
σ∗pi
)
]
σ∗pi
> 0
∂p∗
∂e
=
ev
b
∂B
∂e
+
Bv
b
> 0
and
∂q∗
∂e
= p∗
∂B
∂e
+
∂p∗
∂e
B +
φ(µ
∗
pi+e−
σ∗pi
)
σ∗pi
> 0
Thus
∂EDF ′
∂e
= −∂q
∗
∂e
< 0
∂F
∂e
= − p
∗
σ∗pi
φ(C1)− 1− p
∗
σ∗pi
φ(C2)− ∂p
∗
∂e
[Φ(C2)− Φ(C1)] < 0
By implicit function theorem,
∂V aR′
∂e
= −
∂F
∂e
∂F
∂V aR′
< 0

5.3 Data Sources and Definitions
5.4 Robustness Checks
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Table 5.1: Bank-Specific Variables (1/2)
Data series Definition
ROAA (%) Return on average assets; net income as a percent of average
assets
ROAE (%) Return on average equity; net income as a percent of average
equity
Price/Book (%) Price as a percent of book value per share. Book value is cal-
culated using common equity values and shares outstanding
at the end of a financial period
Noninterest Income Total operating income (revenues) excluding net interest in-
come
Operating Income Total operating income from banking, insurance, and asset
management
Total Gross Loans Loans and finance leases held for investment or held for sale;
net of unearned discount and gross of loss reserves.
Total Deposits Total deposits from customers. For U.S. banks, this is the
total deposits from customers and banks.
Total Assets All assets owned by the company as of the date indicated, as
carried on the balance sheet and defined under the indicated
accounting principles
Total Liabilities Total liabilities as carried on the balance sheet and defined by
the indicated accounting principles.
Total Equity Equity as defined under the indicated accounting principles.
Includes par value, paid in capital, retained earnings, and
other adjustments to equity. Minority interest may be in-
cluded, per relevant accounting standards.
a. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence’s SNL database.
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Table 5.2: Bank-Specific Variables (2/2)
Data series Definition
Tier 1 Ratio (%) Tier 1 capital ratio as defined by the latest regulatory and
supervisory guidelines.
Problem Loans The problem loan value that the company most commonly
presents. If the company commonly reports multiple values,
SNL selects based on the following priority (at SNL’s dis-
cretion): Nonperforming Loans, Gross Impaired Loans, Net
Impaired Loans, and Other Problem Loans.
Cost-to-Income (%) Operating expense as a percent of operating income.
Cost of Funds (%) Interest incurred on liabilities as a percent of average
noninterest-bearing deposits and interest-bearing liabilities
Compensation and
Benefits
Salaries, wages, bonuses, commissions, changes in reserve for
future stock option expense, and other employee benefit costs.
Interest Expense Interest on debt and other borrowings (on an incurred basis).
Includes the amortization of discount (or premiums) and in-
terest on capital leases.
Other Expense Expense not otherwise classified.
a. Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence’s SNL database.
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Table 5.3: Financial Variables (1/2)
Data series Source Definition
Equity prices Bloomberg Daily equity price, closing price
Expected Default Frequency
(EDF) (1 year)
Moody’s Forward-looking measure of actual
probability of default of a bank over
one year. According to the Moody’s
EDF model, a bank defaults when the
market value of its assets falls below its
liabilities payable
3-month T-bill rate Bloomberg Daily 3-month T-bill rate
3-month German government
bond yield
Bloomberg Daily 3-month German government
bond yield
10-year T-bill rate Bloomberg Daily 10-year T-bill rate
10-year German government
bond yield
Bloomberg Daily 10-year German government
bond yield
3-month LIBOR rate Bloomberg Daily 3-month LIBOR rate
3-month EURIBOR rate Bloomberg Daily 3-month EURIBOR rate
Credit spread of Moody’s Baa-
rated bonds
Bloomberg Daily credit spread of Moody’s Baa-
rated bonds
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Table 5.4: Financial Variables (2/2)
Data series Source Definition
Euro Stoxx Banks Index Bloomberg Daily equity index price, closing price
Euro Stoxx 50 Index Bloomberg Daily equity index price, closing price
MSCI Europe Real Estate Index Bloomberg Daily equity index price, closing price
S&P 500 Financials Index Bloomberg Daily equity index price, closing price
S&P 500 index returns Bloomberg Daily equity index price, closing price
Dow Jones U.S. Real Estate In-
dex
Bloomberg Daily equity index price, closing price
MSCI World Index Bloomberg Daily equity index price, closing price
MSCI World Financials Index Bloomberg Daily equity index price, closing price
MSCI World Real Estate Index Bloomberg Daily equity index price, closing price
VIX Index Bloomberg Daily equity index price, closing price
Table 5.5: Macroeconomic Variables
Data series Source Definition
GDP growth IMF WEO Growth of Gross Domestic Product,
constant prices
Interest rate (3 month) OECD Short term (3 months) interest rate,
money market
Government bond yield (10
year)
Haver Analytics 10-Year Government Bond Yield
(AVG, %)
General government bal-
ance
IMF WEO General government structural balance
Central bank claims IMF MFS statis-
tics, Haver Ana-
lytics
Central Bank Survey, Claims on Other
Financial Corporations and Other De-
pository Corporations
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Table 5.6: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES N mean p50 sd min max
Cost of Funds (%) 4,846 1.473 1.146 1.113 0.0476 7.374
Cost-to-Income (%) 5,304 65.40 63.98 17.88 25.27 347.1
Price-to-Book Ratio (%) 4,838 139.1 128.1 68.67 12.51 515.4
ROAA (%) 5,268 0.714 0.811 0.861 -6.022 4.067
ROAE (%) 5,241 7.235 8.372 11.10 -114.7 42.03
Tier 1 Ratio (%) 5,099 13.40 12.60 4.431 4.901 50.77
Problem Loans Ratio (%) 5,134 2.797 1.375 4.603 0 40.39
Loan-to-Asset Ratio (%) 5,306 65.72 68.59 15.08 10.01 92.24
Log(Assets) 5,406 15.83 15.24 2.282 12.32 21.62
Non-Interest Income Share (%) 5,216 28.66 25.18 18.77 0.392 257.6
NII Share (%) X Loan-to-Asset Ratio (%) 5,192 1,742 1,617 1,015 28.77 14,065
Deposit-to-Liability Ratio (%) 5,377 77.17 83.84 19.82 0 99.36
Leverage Ratio 5,401 12.09 10.64 6.099 1.831 69.01
Lerner Index (%) 5,115 26.59 27.41 11.93 -58.00 56.56
ROAA/sd(ROAA) (%) 5,267 2.681 2.080 2.799 -3.063 15.47
ROAA/sd(ROAE) (%) 5,239 2.461 1.876 2.657 -3.144 15.16
Gov Structural Balance/Potential GDP (%) 5,992 -4.463 -4.258 2.645 -19.39 4.360
ST Interest Rate (%) 5,966 1.554 0.644 1.792 -0.784 15.82
Real GDP Growth Rate (%) 5,992 1.825 2.224 2.134 -9.132 25.49
Claim Growth Rate (%) 5,780 90.46 -14.16 381.5 -94.40 6,332
Delta CoVaR (95%) of Weekly Loss (%) 4,710 1.621 1.272 1.918 -4.257 10.50
VaR (95%) of Daily Loss (%) 4,722 3.118 2.569 1.901 0 12.71
Expected Default Frequency (%) 3,669 0.762 0.390 1.722 0.0198 25.15
logit(EDF) 3,669 -5.469 -5.544 0.967 -8.527 -1.091
a. Sources: S&P Global Market Intelligence’s SNL database and IMF staff calculations.
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Table 5.8: Robustness Checks for the Determinants of Risks: Year FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES covar covar VaR VaR trEDF trEDF
ROAA (%) -0.188** -0.580*** -0.142**
(0.0926) (0.0913) (0.0631)
Price-to-Book Ratio (%) 0.00120 -0.00252*** -0.000487
(0.00118) (0.000841) (0.000552)
Non-Interest Income Share (%) 0.0273*** 0.0214*** 0.0108* 0.00507 0.00539** 0.00684**
(0.00812) (0.00646) (0.00650) (0.00545) (0.00267) (0.00270)
NII Share (%) X Loan-to-Asset Ratio (%) -0.000347** -0.000335** -0.000263** -0.000176* -9.56e-05** -0.000105**
(0.000159) (0.000142) (0.000113) (9.67e-05) (4.78e-05) (4.11e-05)
Tier 1 Ratio (%) -0.0411** -0.0557*** -0.0377*** -0.0587*** 0.0108 0.00429
(0.0189) (0.0190) (0.0135) (0.0140) (0.00733) (0.00674)
Problem Loans Ratio (%) -0.00559 -0.00516 0.0551*** 0.0581*** 0.0292*** 0.0325***
(0.00811) (0.00795) (0.0139) (0.0124) (0.00461) (0.00541)
Real GDP Growth Rate (%) -0.0293 -0.0379 -0.0772*** -0.113*** -0.0221** -0.0323***
(0.0296) (0.0320) (0.0288) (0.0283) (0.00973) (0.0111)
ST Interest Rate (%) 0.0472 0.0123 0.0115 -0.0372 0.165*** 0.157***
(0.0764) (0.0655) (0.0513) (0.0485) (0.0224) (0.0214)
Gov Structural Balance/Potential GDP (%) -0.0602*** -0.0265 -0.0775*** -0.0614*** -0.0317*** -0.0280***
(0.0225) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0173) (0.00847) (0.00864)
Lerner Index (%) 0.0414*** 0.0259*** -0.00271 -0.0168** 0.00345 0.00645**
(0.00954) (0.00681) (0.00864) (0.00790) (0.00345) (0.00302)
Delta CoVaR (95%) of Weekly Loss (%) = L 0.182*** 0.368***
(0.0218) (0.0343)
VaR (95%) of Daily Loss (%) = L 0.458*** 0.498***
(0.0399) (0.0389)
logit(EDF) = L 0.664*** 0.699***
(0.0301) (0.0332)
Observations 3,864 3,830 3,867 3,833 2,971 2,943
Lags 2 - 6 3 - 9 2 - 7 2 - 7 3 - 5 3 - 6
No. of Intruments 380 412 421 420 260 309
No. of Banks 386 385 387 386 290 287
Hansen p-Value 0.371 0.667 0.762 0.786 0.127 0.681
AR2 p-Value 0.0166 6.46e-05 0.0796 0.560 0.0311 6.77e-10
AR3 p-Value 0.788 0.761 0.543 0.321 0.138 0.000174
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
a. The dynamic panel regression with year fixed effects. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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